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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Members of armed forces are sent off to war to kill enemy combatants.  
They are not sent off to kill civilians.  Nonetheless, modern wars invariably 
result in far more civilian deaths than military deaths.1  This Article 
examines the collateral damage rule,2 one of the central operational rules 
regulating the conduct of hostilities, that essentially permits civilian 
casualties only when they are incidental to an attack on a legitimate military 
target.  The rule is explored in light of the changing nature of warfare over 
the last two centuries including the shifting ratios of military to civilian war-
related deaths.  The Article ultimately questions the continuing validity of 
this rule when, in recent decades, the overall statistics for war-related deaths 
reveal that civilian fatalities are considerably greater than military deaths. 
The collateral damage rule, also known as the proportionality rule, is 
meant to offer protection to civilians in wartime and to give content to the 
principle of distinction in contexts where military and civilian targets are 
interwoven.3  That statement reflects the usual assessment of the collateral 
damage rule but this Article asks whether that assessment simply tricks us 
into thinking that ethical military advisors, by following the rule, will in fact 
avoid all but incidental damage to civilians.  If the many and varied studies 
on the ratios of civilian to military war-related deaths reveal disproportionate 
civilian deaths (as they do) and if the many and varied epidemiological 
studies reveal war-related civilian displacement, disease, deprivation, and 
famine (as they do), the Article asks whether the collateral damage rule has 
become simply an organized deceit to persuade us that condoning the 
combatant’s privilege (permitting solders to kill enemy combatants)4 is not 
signing the death warrant for civilians, except “incidentally.”  The Article 
argues that in the context of modern warfare, the collateral damage rule can 
never accomplish what it purports to do, except in the most temporally 
restricted sense.  It then explores what should be the fate of a legal rule that 
is central to the laws of armed conflict and cannot, by the nature of the 
context in which the rule is operative, be effective. 
                                                                                                                   
 1 See infra Part III and notes 54–124.  
 2 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I), art. 51, ¶ 5(b), June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter API]. 
 3 See JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 
93–94 (2004) (highlighting the definition of an indiscriminate attack and explaining the 
relationship between the prohibition on such attacks and the requirement of proportionality). 
 4 GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN 
WAR 41–42 (2010). 
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Trying to determine when there is sufficient armed violence to constitute 
armed conflict or war is difficult and varies depending on what is being 
studied.  Classifying the different types of armed conflict is controversial and 
changes depending on the focus of the research.  Quantifying military and 
civilian deaths in armed conflict presents multiple classification problems 
and much disputed or unavailable data.5  Nonetheless, despite all of these 
difficulties, it has become possible to discern significant trends within the 
last two centuries.  Part II of this Article examines the changes that have 
taken place, over roughly the last two centuries, regarding the types of wars 
that occur.  Part III focuses on the shifting ratio of military to civilian war-
related deaths during this period, noting that we now live in an era where 
wars result in a hugely disproportionate loss of civilian lives.  Part IV traces 
the history and applicability of the collateral damage rule, also known as the 
proportionality rule.  Part V brings together the data on the changes in the 
types of wars fought and the shift from mainly military to mainly civilian 
war-related deaths.  Part V further asks what continuing regulatory effect the 
collateral damage rule can be expected to exert when the data on war-related 
deaths inevitably indicates that the rule has utterly failed to achieve its 
purpose.  Part VI makes a few modest suggestions that may, in some 
measure, help fulfill the purpose of the collateral damage rule. 
II.  THE CHANGING NATURE OF WARFARE 
A.  The Threshold of War/Armed Conflict 
Characterizing different types of armed conflict is difficult and different 
authors have taken somewhat different approaches.  First, there is the 
question of which armed conflicts are sufficiently serious to be taken out of 
the category of “internal disturbances and tensions”6 and placed into the 
category of armed conflict.  Picking which armed conflicts merit study will 
often depend upon the issues being researched.  Many authors choose a 
certain level of deaths in armed conflict per year to qualify for inclusion in 
statistical data.  For example, in their seminal book, Resort to War, Meredith 
Reid Sarkees and Frank Whelon Wayman use the standard of conflict that 
produces “1,000 [battle-related] deaths per year (or twelve month period).”7  
                                                                                                                   
 5 See infra Part III.B. 
 6 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), art. 1, ¶¶ 1–2, June 
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter APII]. 
 7 MEREDITH REID SARKEES & FRANK WHELON WAYMAN, RESORT TO WAR: A DATA GUIDE 
TO INTER-STATE, EXTRA-STATE, INTRA-STATE, AND NON-STATE WARS, 1816–2007, at 61 
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This was the war typology used by Singer and Small in two earlier studies,8 
and is also used by authors such as R.J. Rummel9 and many others.10  It 
should be noted here that this typology does not address the issue of when 
international humanitarian law becomes applicable either to international 
armed conflict—also called inter-state armed conflict—or to non-
international armed conflict.  That very different question is answered by 
examining the language of the Four Geneva Conventions: Common Article 2 
(inter-state wars and occupation); Common Article 3 (conflict not of an 
international character); Additional Protocol I, Article 1 (inter-state wars, but 
including fighting against colonial domination, alien occupation, and racist 
regimes when exercising their right of self-determination); Additional 
Protocol II, Article 1 (internal armed conflicts: “Conflicts . . . which take 
place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces 
and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups” that meet 
certain conditions).11  Before discussing classifications of warfare, it should 
be noted that there is extensive literature on this issue, largely engaged in by 
political scientists.  The categories discussed below are intended to be broad-
brush categories as the overall purpose of this Article is not to support or 
attack any particular categorization of warfare, but rather to examine the 
overall changing nature of combat, particularly as it relates to the collateral 
damage rule.  
                                                                                                                   
(2010). 
 8 J. DAVID SINGER & MELVIN SMALL, THE WAGES OF WAR, 1816–1965: A STATISTICAL 
HANDBOOK 32, 38–39 (1972); MELVIN SMALL & J. DAVID SINGER, RESORT TO ARMS: 
INTERNATIONAL AND CIVIL WAR, 1816–1980, at 46–50 (1982).  These studies were part of the 
Correlates of War Project originally established at the University of Michigan in 1963 and 
now carried out at various U.S. universities.  Correlates of War, History, COW, http://www. 
correlatesofwar/cowhistory.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2013); Correlates of War, Ongoing 
Research, COW, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ongoing.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2013). 
 9 E.g., R.J. Rummel, Democracies are Less Warlike than Other Regimes, 1 EUR. J. INT’L 
REL. 457 (1995) (examining core studies related to war data, including those by Singer and 
Small). 
 10 E.g., Jack S. Levy, Thomas C. Walker & Martin S. Edwards, Continuity and Change in 
the Evolution of Warfare, in WAR IN A CHANGING WORLD (Zeev Maoz & Azar Gat eds., 
2001).  Other compilations have much lower thresholds, e.g., twenty-five annual battle deaths 
as adopted by Nils Petter Gleditsch et al., Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset, 39 J. 
PEACE RES. 615, 617 (2002). 
 11 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, arts. 2–3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 
[hereinafter GI]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick 
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, arts. 2–3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 
75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GII]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War, arts. 2–3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GIII]; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, arts. 2–3, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; API, supra note 2, art. 1; APII, supra note 6, art. 1. 
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B.  Categorizing Types of Armed Conflict 
Using the “1,000 [battled—related] deaths per year” typology,12 wars can 
be characterized in a number of ways depending upon the particular focus of 
study.  Law categorizes armed conflict into inter-state or international armed 
conflict (IAC) and non-international armed conflict taking place within a 
state.  Because a number of changes have taken place in the international 
community, including the creation of a wider variety of entities with the 
capacity to wage war, a more nuanced categorization of armed conflict is 
necessary in order to grasp the extent of the changing nature of armed 
conflict. The typologies discussed below largely, but not entirely, follow the 
categories used by Sarkees and Wayman. 
1.  Interstate Armed Conflict 
For the purposes of this Article, interstate armed conflicts are those that 
include state participants on both sides of the battle.  Although a conflict may 
involve multiple parties, this Article does not seek to include or exclude such 
conflict on the basis of troops committed or killed,13 provided that the overall 
battle-related deaths in the conflict amount to at least 1,000 and that most of 
the fighting is carried out by state entities.  Non-state entities, such as 
colonies, non-autonomous territories, and organized armed groups may well 
take part in such conflicts, but the state entities must be engaged in the bulk 
of combat activities.14  
2.  Armed Conflict by States Against Overseas Non-State Entities  
There are two types of conflict with overseas non-state entities.  In the 
first type, a state engages in armed conflict with a dependent entity situated 
outside the state’s territorial boundaries, such as a colony, protectorate, 
special territory, mandate territory, or dependency.15  Frequently these 
                                                                                                                   
 12 SARKEES & WAYMAN, supra note 7. 
 13 States are sometimes qualified as war participants if they meet either of the following 
thresholds: 100 fatalities or 1,000 troops in active combat roles.  Id. 
 14 Id. at 61–62. 
 15 Examples include the French/Algerian War (1954–1962), which led to Algerian 
independence from France; The Franco-Vietnamese War (1946–1954), which led to the 
withdrawal of France from Vietnam and the partition of Vietnam into North Vietnam and 
South Vietnam.  See generally Raphaelle Branche, Torture and Other Violations of the Law 
by the French Army During the Algerian War, in GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES & THE WEST: 
HISTORY AND COMPLICITY 134 (Adam Jones ed., 2004); YVES BEIGBEDER, JUDGING WAR 
CRIMES AND TORTURE: FRENCH JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS AND 
COMMISSIONS (1940–2005), at 61–77 (2006) (providing a brief history of the Franco-
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conflicts will involve combat designed either to curb or to achieve 
independence from the controlling state.16  The second type of conflict 
involving non-state entities arises when a state is engaged in combat against 
a non-state entity, such as Al Qaeda, where that entity has not been under the 
power or control of the state party to the conflict.17  In this context, the aims 
of the non-state entity may well include preventing the state participant from 
wielding military or other economic power in certain parts of the globe but 
does not focus on gaining political statehood for itself.  Authorities, such as 
Sarkees and Wayman, describe this type of conflict as “extra-state war.”18 
3.  Internal Armed Conflict 
Internal armed conflicts, also known as non-international armed conflicts 
(NIAC), occur within the boundaries of a particular state.  There are various 
types of these conflicts.  One is a civil war in which an established state 
government’s armed forces are fighting against an organized group or groups 
within the state’s territory when such groups are capable of sustained 
military activity.19  The requirement that the non-state entity should be 
capable of sustained military activity is used principally to distinguish 
sustained military activities from short-lived outbursts of violence such as 
sudden massacres or sporadic riots where the death toll may well be more 
than 1,000 but there is no systematic organization within or between the 
attacking groups.20  Additional Protocol II, which applies to NIAC, includes 
an organizational requirement as part of its first article, explaining when the 
Protocol is applicable: 
This Protocol . . . [applies] to all armed conflicts . . . which take 
place in the territory of the High Contracting Party between its 
armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized 
armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise 
such control over part of its territory as to enable them to carry 
                                                                                                                   
Vietnamese War and international response). 
 16 SARKEES & WAYMAN, supra note 7, at 193. 
 17 See id. at 63.  Since the September 11, 2001 bombings in the U.S. by Al Qaeda—a non-
state, Sunni Muslim, paramilitary, international organization—the United States has 
systematically attacked Al Qaeda targets. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. at 65–66.  Difficult issues can arise when civil wars result in power shifts, such as 
when an existing government is largely ousted from power by a rebel group and some 
members of the international community recognize the rebels as the new government while 
others continue to support the earlier government.   
 20 Id.  
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out sustained and concerted military operations and to 
implement this Protocol.21 
Other forms of internal armed conflict occur within a state when different 
non-state entities fight each other but are not engaged in combat against the 
central government.  Sometimes a regional or substate government may be 
engaged in combat with rebel groups; sometimes none of the fighting entities 
will be connected with any governing authority.22 
C.  Transnational and National Conflicts and Their Transmutation 
Inter-state armed conflict will, of course, take place between at least two 
states and possibly more, but where non-state entities are involved the exact 
nature of the conflict may be called into question.  Where rebel groups are 
fighting a central or substate government, the combat is likely to be 
contained within the territory of a particular state, although sympathizers 
from other states may join the fight.23  Non-state armed groups may carry on 
armed activities in a number of different states simultaneously; their combat 
activities may be directed against state entities or against other non-state 
groups.24 
Armed conflict categories are seldom static. Conflict can start out in one 
category of combat and change over time into another category.  The 
category of conflict may change several times during the course of a war.  
Fighting in one part of a state’s territory may be designated as a particular 
category of conflict while fighting in another part of the state’s territory is 
categorized differently.  The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
                                                                                                                   
 21 APII, supra note 6, art. 1, ¶ 1.  However, Additional Protocol I—the title of which states 
that it relates to “the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict”—states that it 
also applies to certain forms of internal conflict: 
 [A]rmed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination 
and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right 
of self-determination . . . . 
API, supra note 2, art. 1, ¶ 4. 
  This requirement for application of Protocol I, unlike the similar section in Protocol II, 
does not demand any particular level of organization other than a declaration of purpose 
within the scope of the above definition.  This would only require some level of 
communication sufficient to pursue the purpose. 
 22 SARKEES & WAYMAN, supra note 7, at 485.  For a list of all wars by classification, see id. 
at 579–94. 
 23 Id. at 337–40 (noting the shrinking distinction between activities in inter-state and intra-
state conflict, explaining civil wars generally, and describing the consequences of external 
intervention). 
 24 Id. at 485; see also id. at 46 tbl.2.1 (listing COW war typologies including those for non-
state wars). 
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Yugoslavia has noted this mutability phenomenon in Prosecutor v. Duško 
Tadić: 
It is indisputable that an armed conflict is international if it 
takes place between two or more States.  In addition, in case of 
an internal armed conflict breaking out on the territory of a 
State, it may become international (or, depending upon the 
circumstances, be international in character alongside an 
internal armed conflict) if (i) another State intervenes in that 
conflict through its troops, or alternatively if (ii) some of the 
participants in the internal armed conflict act on behalf of that 
other State.25 
Indeed, in the Tadić case, the Tribunal devotes a whole section—running 
to fifty-seven paragraphs over twenty-six pages—to “The Legal Criteria for 
Establishing When, in an Armed Conflict Which is Prima Facie Internal, 
Armed Forces May be Regarded as Acting On Behalf of a Foreign Power, 
Thereby Rendering the Conflict International.”26  The Tribunal also noted the 
disagreement that has arisen between itself and the International Court of 
Justice on certain issues regarding classification of armed conflict.27  The fact 
that armed conflicts can change from internal to international and back again, 
or can have both types of conflict operating alongside each other, obviously 
complicates the compilation of data on war classification.  
D.  The Changing Prevalence of the Types of Armed Conflict 
There are many studies on the prevalence of armed conflict stretching 
over the last two hundred years.  Sarkees and Wayman’s study in Resort to 
War: 1816–2007 is perhaps the most comprehensive and current and this 
section of the Article relies heavily on their data.28   
                                                                                                                   
 25 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 84 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). 
 26 Id. § 3. 
 27 Id. ¶¶ 115–145 (discussing the effective control test found in Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) (Merits) 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 109, 115 (June 
27)).  
 28 SARKEES & WAYMAN, supra note 7. 
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1.  The Prevalence of Inter-state Armed Conflicts 
Sarkees and Wayman report that “[i]nter-state wars are relatively rare, 
with only ninety-five inter-state wars over the past 192 years.”29  The data 
also reveals that the early years of the nineteenth century were relatively 
peaceful for this category of war.  This might be explained by the low 
number of states at the time except for the fact that several succeeding 
decades (1847–1856; 1857–1866; 1877–1886) experienced a marked rise in 
the onset of inter-state wars although the number of states had not risen 
significantly.30 
Beginning with the decade 1897–1906, the figures indicate that each 
decade experienced at least five onsets of inter-state war.31  Three decades 
log the highest number of inter-state war onsets with 1857–1866 having the 
greatest number, followed by 1967–1976, and then by 1977–1986.32  For the 
last two decades studied, 1987–1996 and 1997–2006, the number of inter-
state war onsets have logged in at five per decade, which equals the overall 
average for the entire period studied.33  One further point of interest: 
American, Canadian, and European scholars are sometimes (rightly) berated 
for their Eurocentric outlook.34  It is salient to note, therefore, that Sarkees 
and Wayman have undertaken a global study and the area of the world with 
the greatest number of inter-state wars for the period studied is Asia, 
followed by Europe and the Middle East.35   
2.  The Prevalence of Extra-territorial Armed Conflicts by States Against 
Non-State Entities 
Wars that take place between a state and a non-state entity largely outside 
the territory of the state are “much more common than inter-state wars, with 
163 . . . [such] wars, compared with 95 inter-state wars . . . between 1816 and 
2007.  Even so, . . . [such] wars do not occur that frequently.”36  Because 
these wars are fought between states and non-state entities, study figures are 
                                                                                                                   
 29 Id. at 188. 
 30 Id. at 188–91. 
 31 Id. at 190 fig.3.3. 
 32 Id.  
 33 Id. 
 34 See id. at 45 (explaining that Sarkees and Wayman took an uncommonly expansive 
methodological approach to move beyond the perception of Eurocentricity evident in prior 
studies). 
 35 Id. at 190 fig.3.4. 
 36 Id. at 333 (referring to these wars as “extra-state wars”). 
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necessarily tied to the number of state and non-state entities with the capacity 
for combat. 
In the decades when colonies were seeking independence the incidence of 
these wars rose, as it has more recently with the increase of international 
para-military organizations such as Al Qaeda.37  There was a high incidence 
of state versus non-state wars in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries when the imperial powers were fighting indigenous peoples in 
order to establish colonies.38  The incidence of these wars rose again in the 
decade from 1947–1956 which saw the start of the colonial struggle for 
independence.39  After that time, the colonial powers, realizing that colonial 
independence was a foregone conclusion, seldom resorted to war to retain a 
colony.  Asia is again the area of the world that has experienced the highest 
incidence of this type of armed conflict.40 
3.  The Prevalence of Internal Armed Conflicts  
Sarkees and Wayman catalogue 335 internal armed conflicts during the 
period studied (1816–2007); that is more than three times the number of 
inter-state wars and more than double the number of extra-territorial state 
versus non-state wars in the same period.41  Excluded from this number are 
another sixty-two wars that are labeled “non-state wars.”42  These are wars 
that take place between non-state entities either in territory not yet under the 
control of a state (61 wars) or that take place across state borders (1 war).43  
If we combine all of these wars into the broader category of internal armed 
conflicts, obviously, the numbers rise even higher.  However, excluding the 
latter sixty-two wars, the great increase in internal armed conflict begins 
during the 1957–1966 decade and keeps rising until the last decade studied 
1997–2006, which saw a modest decline from the highest incidence.44  Many 
of these internal armed conflicts became internationalized in the sense that 
one or more states ultimately intervened in the conflict.45 
Looking at the figures for the sixty-two wars that are categorized as 
between non-state entities taking place either in a non-state territory or across 
                                                                                                                   
 37 Id. at 335 fig.4.3. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 336. 
 41 Id. at 337.  Sarkees and Wayman list 103 inter-state wars and mention 163 extra-
territorial wars.  Id. at 76–77 tbl.3.1, 194. 
 42 Id. at 485. 
 43 Id.  
 44 Id. at 483 fig.5.3. 
 45 Id. 
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state borders, the greatest prevalence occurs during the nineteenth century in 
what Sarkees and Wayman refer to as the “prestate-formation” period.46  
Given their definition of this category of wars, this terminology is not 
surprising.  Africa, Asia, and the Western Hemisphere have experienced by 
far the greatest incidence of these sixty-two wars.47  Again, this is 
unsurprising given the history of colonialism and state formation.  
4.  Conclusions on the Prevalence of Types of Armed Conflicts  
From the categories of armed conflict and the data discussed above, it is 
easy to discern that during the last two centuries, inter-state wars are the least 
prevalent (95); state versus non-state entities are at the mid-prevalence level 
(163); and internal armed conflicts top the prevalence chart (335 plus another 
62, totaling 397).  It is also clear that the incidence of internal armed 
conflicts has seen a dramatic rise since the middle of the twentieth century.  
In any decade during the last two centuries, the maximum number of 
inter-state wars is ten.48  For extra-territorial wars between states and non-
state entities, the maximum number of wars in any decade is eighteen, with a 
very marked decline after 1956—five being the maximum number for any 
decade since then.49  For internal armed conflicts, the pattern is wholly 
different.  The second half of the twentieth century saw a dramatic rise in 
such wars.  From 1957 on, every decade has seen more than twenty internal 
armed conflict wars, with forty internal armed conflicts during 1987–1996 
and thirty-five during 1997–2006.50  As Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter 
Gleditsch note in an updated global combat dataset, there are “declining 
numbers of major interstate conflicts and internationalised[sic] civil 
wars . . . . [and] most warfare is in the form of civil conflict and wars of state 
failure.”51  The Human Security Report 2009/2010 comes to the same 
conclusion: 
The overwhelming majority of armed conflicts are now fought 
within states.  These intrastate conflicts have relatively low 
annual battle-death tolls on average and have made up an 
increasing proportion of all conflicts since the end of World 
                                                                                                                   
 46 Id. at 537. 
 47 Id. at 540 fig.6.4. 
 48 Id. at 190 fig.3.3. 
 49 Id. at 335 fig.4.3. 
 50 Id. at 483 fig.5.3. 
 51 Bethany Lacina & Nils Petter Gleditsch, Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New 
Dataset of Battle Deaths, 21 EUR. J. POPULATION 145, 160 (2005). 
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War II.  In the late 1940s, they made up little over half of all 
conflicts; by the early 1990s, their share was closer to 90 
percent.52 
However, that report also notes that: “[w]ith very few exceptions, 
international conflicts have been far more deadly than intrastate conflicts.”53 
III.  THE SHIFTING RATIO OF MILITARY TO CIVILIAN WAR-RELATED 
DEATHS 
A.  Introduction 
In a 2001 study sponsored by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) the authors make the following assessment of the ratio of 
military to civilian deaths in modern wars: 
The research reveals, in essence, that modern wars have 
become conflicts without limits.  Civilians have—both 
intentionally and by accident—been moved to center stage in 
the theater of war, which was once fought primarily on 
battlefields.  This fundamental shift in the character of war is 
illustrated by a stark statistic: in World War I, nine soldiers 
were killed for every civilian life lost.  In today’s wars, it is 
estimated that ten civilians die for every soldier or fighter 
killed in battle.54 
There have been several rigorous critiques of the accuracy of this ratio, 
which will be discussed below, but it55 is this shift in the ratio of military to 
civilian war-related deaths that is the primary focus of this section of the 
Article.   
                                                                                                                   
 52 HUMAN SECURITY REPORT PROJECT, HUMAN SECURITY REPORT 2009/2010, at 160 (2011) 
[hereinafter HUMAN SECURITY REPORT PROJECT]; see also KALEVI J. HOLSTI, THE STATE, 
WAR, AND THE STATE OF WAR (1996), available at http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-
reports/20092010/text.aspx (detailing the growing number of intra-state wars from 1945 to 
1995).  
 53 Human Security Report Project, supra note 52, at 22 fig.1.2. 
 54 Stanley B. Greenberg & Robert O. Boorstin, People On War: Civilians in the Line of 
Fire, PUB. PERSP., Nov./Dec. 2001, at 18, 19. 
 55 See infra Part III.C.3.b.i. 
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B.  Problems with Compiling Data on War-Related Casualties  
This Article claims no in-depth knowledge of statistics and does not seek 
to endorse any particular method of compiling data on war-related casualties.  
There are many articles that assess various statistical models used for this 
task.56  Each compilation tends to be idiosyncratic57 and often rely, to some 
extent, on data supplied by non-impartial parties to the conflicts, such as 
opposing military forces.  The estimates of military and civilian deaths can 
vary widely.  Some studies provide figures compiled from various databases 
and then estimate average or median numbers.58  Even with careful 
explanations and limiting provisos, it remains true that “such figures at times 
display enormous variance.”59  Nonetheless, through examining a variety of 
available reports on war casualties, broad trends are observable over time.  It 
is these trends, discussed below, that are relevant to the argument pursued in 
this Article. 
C.  War-Related Casualties  
1.  U.S. Military Deaths 
An examination of U.S. military deaths is instructive.  In 2010, the U.S. 
Congressional Research Service issued a compilation of United States 
military war-related deaths and injuries beginning with the Revolutionary 
War (1775–1783) and ending with the most recent Iraq War—named 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)—and Afghan War—named Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF).60  The highest totals for U.S. military deaths, in 
declining order, occurred during World War II (WWII): 405,399; The Civil 
War (Union forces only): 364,511; World War I (WWI): 116,516; the 
                                                                                                                   
 56 See, e.g., Beth Osborne Daponte, Wartime Estimates of Iraqi Civilian Casualties, 89 
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 943 (2007) (examining multiple approaches to estimate civilian 
casualties for the conflict in Iraq and comparing challenges raised by these approaches). 
 57 By idiosyncratic I mean that a study covers statistics of one or more particular wars in a 
specified time frame or geographic area.  The studies also differ on exactly which types of 
deaths are included in the data.  
 58 See, e.g., Matthew White, Death Tolls for the Majors Wars and Atrocities of the 
Twentieth Century, NECROMETRICS, http://necrometrics.com/20c1m.htm (last updated June 
2011). 
 59 MILTON LEITENBERG, DEATHS IN WARS AND CONFLICTS IN THE 20TH CENTURY 3 (3d ed. 
2006), available at http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2006/20060800_cdsp_occ_leitenb 
erg.pdf. 
 60 ANNE LELAND & MARI-JANA “M-J” OBOROCEANU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32492, 
AMERICAN WAR AND MILITARY OPERATIONS CASUALTIES: LISTS AND STATISTICS (2010). 
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Vietnam Conflict: 58,220; and the Korean War: 36,574.61  The more recent 
U.S. wars have seen far fewer U.S. military deaths ranging from 4,365 in the 
Iraq War62 to 1,948 deaths in the Persian Gulf War63 and 973 in the Afghan 
War (through February 6, 2010).64  Of course, if Confederate Army deaths 
are included in the statistics (estimates range from roughly 258,000 to 
roughly 289,000),65 the Civil War would have the highest number of military 
deaths for the United States. 
What the figures above reveal is that since WWII, military deaths for U.S. 
soldiers have dropped dramatically.  Of course, those figures are for only one 
armed contingent in wars that always had at least two opposing contingents 
and often had many military and other armed contingents.  Milton Leitenberg 
has been compiling figures on war-related deaths for many years.  In his 
2006 compilation he presents figures for all deaths in wars and conflicts from 
1945–2000, broken down by civilian and military deaths.66  For example, he 
estimates the overall military deaths in the Vietnam Conflict as 1,158,000 
and in the Korean War as 1,672,000.67 
2.  Overall Military Deaths 
There are a number of compilations of worldwide military deaths; Milton 
Leitenberg’s comprehensive study covers the twentieth century.68  The Peace 
Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) has released a series of “battle death” 
statistics, which has been updated from time to time, most recently in 2009, 
covering the years 1946–2008.69  Micheal Clodfelter’s massive compendium 
of military deaths runs from 1494–2007.70  The Correlates of War Data Sets 
list “battle-related combatant fatalities” from 1816–2007, suffered by the 
                                                                                                                   
 61 Id. at 2, 3 tbl.1. 
 62 Id. at 16 tbl.13. 
 63 Id. at 12 tbl.9. 
 64 Id. at 14 tbl.11.  As of July 2012, the number of U.S. military deaths in Afghanistan totals 
2,028, as reported by the U.S. Dept. of Defense.  Names of the Dead, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 
2012, at A6. 
 65 Compare Civil War Casualties, CIVIL WAR TRUST (last visited Feb. 15 2013) (setting 
total deaths at 620,000), with Civil War Statistics, PHIL.MUNI.CZ (last visited Feb. 15, 2013) 
(setting Confederate casualties at 289,000). 
 66 LEITENBERG, supra note 59, at 73–79 tbl.2. 
 67 Id. at 76–77. 
 68 Id. 
 69 BETHANY LACINA & GABRIEL URIARTE, PRIO BATTLE DEATHS DATASET (2009), available 
at http://www.prio.no/sptrans/1555324504/PRIObd3.0_documentation.pdf (combining military 
and civilian deaths occurring in combat). 
 70 MICHEAL CLODFELTER, WARFARE AND ARMED CONFLICTS: A STATISTICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF CASUALTY AND OTHER FIGURES 1494–2007 (3d ed. 2008).   
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state for inter-state wars, or suffered by each side in the case of intra-state 
wars and non-state wars.71  An earlier version of the data sets also lists these 
fatalities for extra-state wars, although thirty of these wars have been 
reclassified as intra-state wars and the data only runs until 1997.72  The latest 
data set lists ninety-five inter-state wars, running from the Franco-Spanish 
War of 1823 to the invasion of Iraq in 2003;73 335 intra-state wars running 
from the First Caucasus War (Russia/Georgians) 1818–1822 to the Second 
Yemeni Cleric War (Yemen/Zaidi Muslims) 2007;74 and 62 non-state wars, 
running from The First Maori Tribal War of 1818–1824 to The Hemda-
Lendu War of 1999–2005.75  The data set also includes 163 extra-state wars, 
running from the Allied Bombardment of Algiers of 1816 to the Iraqi 
Resistance, which began in 2003.76  As the criteria for inclusion in each list is 
the same,77 the overall battle-related combatant fatalities for each list during 
this period are revealing.  The total fatalities for inter-state wars are 
32,145,485; for extra-state wars are 2,645,294; for intra-state wars are 
8,193,883; and for non-state wars (between or among non-state entities) are 
255,736.78  In a number of these wars the data is entered as unknown so that 
presumably the actual overall military deaths are higher than the figures 
reported. 
3.  Civilian War-Related Deaths 
  a.  Problems with Data Compilation on Civilian War-Related Deaths 
One problem with the various tabulations on civilian war-related 
casualties is that it is often impossible to discover what percentage of the 
                                                                                                                   
 71 Correlates of War, COW Wars v. 4.0, 1816–2007, COW [hereinafter COW Wars], 
available at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ (follow “Available Data Sets” hyperlink; then 
follow “The New COW War Data, 1816 – 2007 (v4.0)” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 15, 
2013).  The war data sets are now hosted at American University and The University of 
Michigan-Dearborn and are compiled by Meredith Reid Sarkees & Frank Whelon Wayman.  
Correlates of War, Data Set Hosting Program, COW, available at http://www.correlatesofw 
ar.org/dataset_hosting.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). 
 72 COW Wars, supra note 71. 
 73 SARKEES & WAYMAN, supra note 7, at 75, 76–77 tbl.1.1. 
 74 Id. at 337, 342–46 tbl.5.1. 
 75 Id. at 385, 487 tbl.6.1. 
 76 Id. at 194, 195–97 tbl.4.1. 
 77 The criteria for inclusion is that the war “must involve sustained combat, involving 
organized armed forces, resulting in a minimum of 1,000 battle-related combatant fatalities 
within a twelve month period.”  COW Wars, supra note 71 (follow “Inter-State Wars 
Codebook.pdf” hyperlink).   
 78 Numbers calculated by author based on COW Wars, supra note 73.  
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civilian deaths and injuries were incidental to military attacks.  Many of the 
statistical data sets have rejected the notion of disaggregating military 
casualties from civilian casualties caused by military attacks.  For example, 
Lacina and Gleditsch report on worldwide battle-deaths covering the years 
1946–2002.79  By the term battle-deaths they mean to include “all people, 
soldiers and civilians, killed in combat.”80  Their figures are thus 
compilations of all persons killed in military operations during war.  They 
report that the five wars that inflicted the largest numbers of battle-deaths in 
the period studied were: Vietnam War (1955–1975): 2,097,705; Korean War 
(1950–1953): 1,254,811; Chinese Civil War (1980–1988): 1,200,000; Iran-
Iraq War (1980–1988): 644,500; and the Afghan Civil War (1978–2002): 
562,995.81  They also recognize that many other deaths come in the wake of 
war “due to insecurity, displacement, deprivation, and disease.”82  
The public health consequences of war are also receiving considerable 
scholarly attention.83  Some estimates suggest that indirect effects of military 
conflicts on mortality may be as large as the direct effect of armed conflict.84  
Governments tend to keep detailed statistics on military deaths but seldom 
have comprehensive civilian death statistics.  Sometimes they keep statistics 
on their own civilian deaths (killed by the enemy) but almost never keep 
public statistics or estimates of civilians they have killed in the enemy 
country.  For example, in the United States, the Congressional Research 
Service publishes figures on U.S. military deaths compiled by the 
Department of Defense85 but publishes only sporadic, limited figures on 
civilian deaths.86  As Adam Roberts concludes: “despite extensive 
investigations in many war zones, and significant methodological 
development, there is still a shortage of reliable data on civilian victims of 
                                                                                                                   
 79 Lacina & Gleditsch, supra note 51, at 152ff. 
 80 Id. at 148.  The authors also state: “Measuring battle deaths answers the question of how 
many people were killed in military operations during a war and, therefore, it is the best 
measure of the scale, scope, and nature of the military engagement that has taken place.” Id. 
 81 Id. at 154 tbl.1. 
 82 Id. at 158. 
 83 E.g., WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD REPORT ON VIOLENCE AND HEALTH 
(Etienne G. Krug et al. eds., 2002), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/2002/92415456 
15.pdf; C.J.L. Murray et al., Armed Conflict as a Public Health Problem, 324 BRIT. MED. J. 
346 (2002).  
 84 Murray et al., supra note 83, at 347. 
 85 U.S. Dep’t of Def., Defense Casualty Analysis System, DMDC.OSD.MIL, https://www.dm 
dc.osd.mil/dcas/casualties.xhtml (last visited Feb. 17, 2013).  
 86 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Def., Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) U.S. Casualty Status, 
DEFENSE.GOV, http://www.defense.gov/news/casualty.pdf (last updated Feb. 15, 2013) 
(including civilian casualties but only for civilian employed by Department of Defense).  
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war.”87  Beth Osborne Daponte has undertaken a careful analysis of the 
statistical methodologies of five different civilian war death studies, and even 
for the study she finds to have the “most credence,” she also concludes that it 
presents “imperfect figures.”88 
In all of the compilations there is disagreement about who should count as 
a civilian, and also who among those designated as civilians should be 
included in the statistics.  Roberts distinguishes seven categories that have 
appeared in various compilations:  
All too often, there is a lack of clarity about which of the 
following categories of civilian casualties are included in any 
given set of figures: 
1. Those killed as a direct effect of war; 
2. Those injured as a direct effect of war; 
3. Those dying, whether during or after a war, from 
indirect effects of war such as disease, malnutrition 
and lawlessness, and who would not have been 
expected to die at such rates from such causes in the 
absence of the war; 
4. Victims of one-sided violence, such as when states 
slaughter their own citizens in connection with war;  
5. Victims of rape and other forms of sexual violence in 
connection with a war; 
6. Those uprooted in a war — that is, refugees and 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs); 
7. Those who, even after war is over, die prematurely 
from injuries sustained in war.89  
Obviously, without agreement on which individuals to classify as civilian 
casualties and which categories of civilians count toward war-related deaths, 
the figures are problematic. 
                                                                                                                   
 87 Adam Roberts, Lives and Statistics: Are 90% of War Victims Civilians?, 52 SURVIVAL 
115, 118 (2010). 
 88 Daponte, supra note 56, at 954–57.  
 89 Roberts, supra note 87, at 116. 
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  b.  Problems with Calculating the Ratio of Military to Civilian War-
Related Deaths 
      i.  The 10 to 1; 9 to 1; and 8 to 1 Ratios 
A number of high level studies give the ratio of military to civilian deaths 
in war as somewhere between 10 to 1 and 8 to 1.  For example, the 2001 
ICRC study, quoted in Part III.A above, states that “it is estimated that ten 
civilians die for every soldier or fighter killed in battle.”90  Unfortunately, 
this study gives no authority for that statement.  Some European Union 
documents indicate that since 1990, 90% of those dying in war have been 
civilians.91  Ruth Leger Sivard’s well-known compilations estimated civilian 
deaths in the 1980s as 74% of total deaths and at “close to 90 percent” for the 
year 1990.92  Various UN documents and reports state that civilian war-
related deaths now account for more that 90% of war deaths,93 although 
some have the lower estimate of 75% civilian casualties.94  Kofi Annan, 
Secretary-General of the UN (1997–2006), who cited the 75% figure added 
that, with respect to the percentage of civilian war deaths, “no one really 
knows.”95  Later statistics repeat these ratios, although the language often 
talks of civilian “casualties” or “war victims,” and it is unclear whether the 
figures include displaced people or persons who die from causes not directly 
related to warfare.96  Recently, there have been some outright attacks on the 
10 to 1 or 9 to 1 ratios.  These ratios have been called an “urban myth” of 
modern warfare.97  At the same time, more studies include both military and 
civilian deaths in battle–deaths and give no disaggregated figures.98  
                                                                                                                   
 90 Greenberg & Boorstin, supra note 54, at 19. 
 91 The European Union Institute for Security Studies, A Secure Europe in a Better World: 
European Security Strategy 5 (2003) (Javier Solana), available at http://www.iss.europa.eu/ 
uploads/media/solanae.pdf.  The report was adopted by the European Council on Dec. 12, 
2003.  Id. at tit. p. 
 92 RUTH LEGER SIVARD, WORLD MILITARY AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURES 1991, at 20 (1991). 
 93 U.N. Secretary-General, Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children: Impact of 
Armed Conflict on Children: Rep. of the Expert of the Secretary-General, Ms. Graça Machel, 
¶ 24, U.N. Doc. A/51/150 (Aug. 26, 1996), available at http://www.unicef.org/graca/graright. 
htm; U.N. Dev. Programme, Human Development Rep. 1998: Consumption for Human 
Development 35 (1998), available at http://www.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1998. 
 94 Ditchley Foundation Lecture XXXV (June 26, 1998), available at http://www.ditchely. 
co.uk/conference/past-programme/1990-1999/1998/lecture-xxxv. 
 95 Id. 
 96 See, e.g., PAUL COLLIER ET AL., WORLD BANK, BREAKING THE CONFLICT TRAP: CIVIL 
WAR AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 17–18 (2003) (noting that new military techniques in war 
have a tendency to and may be intended to displace civilian populations, resulting in higher 
casualties). 
 97 HUMAN SECURITY CENTRE, HUMAN SECURITY REPORT 2005: WAR AND PEACE IN THE 21ST 
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After a comprehensive and rigorous examination of numerous high level 
studies that use the nine civilian deaths to every one military death ratio, or 
sometimes a slighter lower ratio of eight civilian deaths to every one military 
death, Roberts concludes that these figures are “based on shaky 
foundations.”99  He does admit that it is possible that some conflict 
situations, such as the Cambodian killings (1975–1979) and the Rwandan 
genocide (1994), “have something close to a 9:1 ratio.”100  He does not come 
to any conclusion about what ratio would be more accurate, but calls for 
“more systematic recording on casualties” and “high standards of rigour and 
professionalism in this work.”101 
      ii.  The Range of Acceptable Ratios of Civilian to Military War-
Related Deaths 
Many sources can be cited to support the proposition that from the time 
that the distinction between soldiers and the non-military population was 
established—roughly the eighteenth century—to the beginning of the 
twentieth century, military deaths in wars generally far outnumbered civilian 
deaths.102  For example, Matthew White reports median estimates of military 
deaths in the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815) as roughly 2 million with the 
median estimate for civilian deaths being roughly 1 million.103  Often there 
are either no figures for civilian deaths in wars before the twentieth century 
or sometimes civilian deaths will include deaths from epidemics, such as 
small pox, which admittedly may have been caused or aggravated by 
wartime conditions.104 
                                                                                                                   
CENTURY 75 (2005), available at http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/2005/text. 
aspx. 
 98 HUMAN SECURITY REPORT PROJECT, supra note 52, at 22 fig. 1.2. 
 99 Roberts, supra note 87, at 115. 
 100 Id. at 126. 
 101 Id. at 128.  Roberts also raises “the admittedly difficult question of whether parties 
involved in armed conflicts are now, or should in future be, under an obligation to report on 
numbers and possibly even names of civilian casualties, or whether the task should be left to 
independent bodies.” Id. 
 102 See. e.g., A.P.V. Rogers, Zero-Casualty Warfare, 82 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 165 (2000) 
(noting that the advent of air power facilitated combat deeper within enemy lines where more 
civilians were harmed); Luc Reydams, A la Guerre Comme à la Guerre: Patterns of Armed 
Conflict, Humanitarian Law Responses and New Challenges, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 734–
36 (2006) (describing the historical development of technology and the law of war, 
culminating in the shift form “civilian war” to “total war”). 
 103 Matthew White, Statistics of Wars, Oppression and Atrocities of the Nineteenth Century, 
NECROMETRICS, http://necrometrics.com/wars19dc.htm (last updated Mar. 2011). 
 104 Id. 
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Many authors, including Walter Clemens and J. David Singer, support the 
view of the historically rising civilian death toll related to war: 
From the end of the Thirty Years’ War in 1648 to the French 
Revolution in 1789, Europe’s princes fought one another with 
relatively small armies.  France’s upheavals, however, gave 
birth to the concept of a “nation in arms.”  Starting at the same 
time, the Industrial Revolution turned cities and factories into 
prime targets.  In most wars of the [twentieth century], civilian 
deaths have outnumbered military deaths.105 
Clemens and Singer have produced charts with the breakdown of military 
and civilian deaths of the “principal international conflicts of the past two 
centuries.”106  Their figures include “[s]oldiers killed in combat” (military 
deaths), and “[c]ivilians killed, plus soldiers who died from wounds, 
accidents or disease”107 (civilian deaths).108  Although some of the nineteenth 
century wars had considerable civilian deaths, in virtually all of the twentieth 
century wars included in the charts civilian deaths outnumber military 
deaths, even though the civilian deaths include “soldiers who died from 
wounds, accidents or disease.”109  These wars include the following: WWI 
(1914–1918); the Russian Civil War and Russo-Polish War (1917–1921); 
Chaco (Bolivia-Paraguay, 1932–1935); WWII (1939–1945); the Franco-
Vietnam War (1945–1954) and U.S.-Vietnam War (1963–1973); Arab-
Israeli Wars (1948–1949, 1967, 1973); Korean War (1950–1953); Belgian 
Congo (1960–1965); Angolan-Portuguese and Civil War (1961–1975; 1975–
1995); Iraq-Iran War (1980–1988); Iraq-Kuwait-U.N. War (1990–1991).110  
In the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939); and the Bangladesh-Pakistan-India 
War (1971) military and civilian deaths are reported as roughly equal.111  In 
the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1941) military deaths slightly outnumber 
civilian deaths.112  Only in the Mozambique-Portuguese and Civil War 
(1965–1975; 1975–1995); the Soviet-Afghanistan War (1979–1989) and the 
                                                                                                                   
 105 Walter C. Clemens, Jr. & J. David Singer, A Historical Perspective: The Human Cost of 
War, 282 SCI. AM. 56, 57 (June 2000); see also Sobhi Tawil, International Humanitarian Law 
and Basic Education, 82 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 581 (2000) (noting that the number of civilian 
victims of conflict has grown since the Cold War era). 
 106 Clemens & Singer, supra note 105, at 56. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. at 57. 
 109 Id. at 56. 
 110 Id. at 56–57. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 56. 
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Serbia-Croatia-Bosnia War (1991–1995) do military deaths outnumber 
civilian deaths.113 
According to widely available statistics, during World War I (1914-1918) 
there were over 15 million deaths.114  Of the total deaths, approximately 8.5 
million were military personnel and 6.8 million were civilians.115  It is 
important to note that these military figures include those combatants who 
died of war-related wounds as well as general diseases, but that the majority 
of military deaths still appear to have been the result of actual combat.116  
Further, a large portion of the civilian deaths seem to be attributable to 
famine and disease.  The majority of Russia’s 2 million civilian deaths “were 
caused by disease.  Hunger, and privation inflated and intensified by war.”117  
Other sources suggest that famine and disease had an even wider impact: 
roughly 6 million dead.118  Necrometrics, a widely quoted study, reports 8.5 
million military deaths for WWI and a broad range of civilian death figures 
running from 5 million to 13 million, although the report admits that some of 
these figures include the Russian Civil War (1917–1922) and the Armenian 
Genocide (1915–1922), while others do not.119 
Matthew White’s Necrometrics estimate of World War II dead comes in 
at 65.6 million, which he compiled from a large number of sources; he gives 
the median estimate as 50 million.120  Of these deaths he estimates roughly 
19.6 million military deaths and 45.9 million civilian deaths.121  The military 
deaths reported range from 22 to 25 million and the civilian deaths range 
from 40 million to 52 million, 13 to 20 million of which may be attributed to 
war-related disease and famine.122 
The debates over the accuracy of particular statistics is often rancorous 
yet there appears to be universal agreement that military deaths most likely 
                                                                                                                   
 113 Id. at 57. 
 114 Matthew White, Source List and Detailed Death Tolls for the Primary Megadeaths of the 
Twentieth Century, NECROMETRICS, http://necormetrics.com/20c5m.htm (last updated Feb. 
2011). 
 115 Id. (calculating the civilian death total to a median range of 6.6–9 million deaths) 
 116 See  MICHEAL CLODFELTER, WARFARE AND ARMED CONFLICTS: A STATISTICAL 
REFERENCE TO CASUALTY AND OTHER FIGURES, 1500–2000, at 479–83 (2d ed. 2002) 
(discussing WWI death figures by country, accounting for both combat and disease). 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. at 480. 
 119 White, supra note 114. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Matthew White, National Death Tolls for the Second World War, NECROMETRICS, http:// 
necrometrics.com/ww2stats.htm#ww2chart (last updated Feb. 2005). 
 122 World War II Casualties, WIKIPEDIA, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World 
_War_II_casualites#cite_note-1 (last updated Mar. 10, 2013).  
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outnumbered civilian deaths in WWI, but that civilian deaths certainly 
outnumbered military deaths in WWII.  
Ruth Leger Sivard also supports the view of rising civilian deaths: 
Increasingly, civilians are the major victims of war.  In the first 
half of [the twentieth century] they represented about 50 
percent of war-related deaths.  In more recent years, however, 
the proportion of civilians in total deaths has been rising.  Wars 
are now more life-threatening for non-combatants than for 
those fighting them.  In the 1960s civilians counted for 63 
percent of the recorded war deaths; in the 1980s for 74 percent; 
and in the 1990s the rate seems to be going higher still.123  
All of the above cited material includes discussion of the difficulty of 
compiling such statistics.  Often these materials used slightly different 
terminology affecting whether certain deaths are included in certain 
categories.  The numbers they report do differ somewhat, and all of them 
have been subjected to trenchant criticism about their statistical 
methodologies.124  Nonetheless, it seems more than fair to conclude that 
since the turn of the twentieth century, civilian deaths have outnumbered 
military deaths in nearly all wars. 
IV.  THE COLLATERAL DAMAGE RULE 
A.  Introduction 
There are two proportionality rules found in the law of armed conflict: 
one found in the jus ad bellum125 and the other found in the jus in bello.126  
The United Nations Charter restricts the initiation of inter-state force to two 
instances: (1) self-defense after suffering an armed attack;127 (2) when 
authorized to use force by the Security Council.128  In the jus ad bellum the 
                                                                                                                   
 123 RUTH LEGER SIVARD, WORLD MILITARY AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURES 1996, at 7 (16th ed., 
1996), available at http://www.ruthsivard.com.wmse96selections.html. 
 124 E.g., Michael Spagat et al., Estimating War Deaths: An Arena of Contestation, 53 J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 934 (2009).  I used to think that law professors engaged in rather 
acrimonious debates.  Having waded through a good number of the articles attacking the 
figures cited, I have now concluded that social scientists far outdo the lawyers on the scale of 
rabid debate.  
 125 The law that regulates when it is permissible to initiate armed force. 
 126 The law that applies in armed conflict regardless of which party initiated the conflict. 
 127 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 128 Id. art. 42. 
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proportionality rule restricts the amount of force used to that which is 
necessary to repel the initial illegal use of force.129  The second 
proportionality rule, also known as the collateral damage rule, is a central 
operational provision of the law of the conduct of hostilities.130  That rule 
emanates from the fundamental rule of distinction between military 
personnel (combatants) and military objects, on the one hand, and civilians 
and civilian objects, on the other hand.131  Civilians and civilian objects may 
not be attacked.132  Combatants and military objects can be attacked.133  
When a combatant kills or injures an opposing combatant or destroys a 
military object it is not a crime under the laws of armed combat.  Although 
civilians or civilian objects may end up being killed, injured, or destroyed in 
warfare, such casualties are only tolerated when the civilian destruction is 
incidental to an attack on a legitimate military target, and then only when the 
civilian casualties are not considered likely to be “excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”134  The difficulty of 
interpreting this rule will be covered below in Part IV.C.  These two 
proportionally rules are usually thought of as separate although it can be 
argued that they are related135 and certainly both rules seek to restrain uses of 
force that might otherwise be thought permissible.  The section below 
focuses on the collateral damage rule found in the jus in bello in light of the 
changing nature of warfare and the disproportionate loss of civilian lives. 
                                                                                                                   
 129 The International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) mentioned this rule of proportionally as 
constituting a customary norm.  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Merits), ¶¶ 176, 194.  See also 2 JOHN BASSET MOORE, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 411–14 (1906) (quoting Daniel Webster’s correspondence 
relating to the Caroline incident and the use of force in self-defense).  Webster wrote that in 
order to justify the destruction of the Caroline, an American ship moored at a U.S. port, as 
permissible self-defense, the British would need to show that they “did nothing unreasonable 
or excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that 
necessity, and  kept clearly within it.”  29 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1138 (1857). 
 130 API, supra note 2. 
 131 Id. art. 48. 
 132 Id. art. 52, ¶ 1. 
 133 Id. arts. 48, 52, ¶ 2. 
 134 Id. art. 51, ¶ 5(b). 
 135 See generally Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 
AM. J. INT’L L. 391 (1993) (describing the development of the dual aspects of proportionality 
as arising from the idea that war is solely aimed at weakening opposing military force). 
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B.  A Brief History of the Collateral Damage Rule 
1.  The Idea of Restraints on Warfare 
The idea of restraint on the methods and means of warfare finds 
expression in the 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg, which provides “[t]hat 
the only legitimate object which states should endeavor to accomplish during 
war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy.”136  From this principle 
sprang the requirement that weapons causing “superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering” are prohibited.137  Certainly combatants are 
authorized to kill the enemy, but their methods are restricted to those that 
enhance military advantage.  Causing superfluous injury, by definition, 
means that the injury is greater than necessary to achieving military success.  
Similarly, unnecessary suffering will, by definition, go beyond what is 
deemed sufficient to achieve military advantage.   
Before the sixteenth century, “war was not only waged against States and 
their armies, but also against their people.  As a result, civilians were at the 
mercy of the conquerors . . . . The notion that war is waged between soldiers 
and that the population should remain outside hostilities . . . became 
established by the eighteenth century.”138  During the nineteenth century, 
wars were generally fought between state armies or organized armed militias, 
and non-combatants were relatively unaffected by the immediate 
consequences of warfare.139  Thus the earlier examples of limits on warfare, 
such as the prohibition on superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering, 
protect combatants rather than civilians.  The prohibition on the denial of 
quarter, that is, not permitting the enemy to surrender and be taken 
prisoner,140 is another example of an early rule derived from humanitarian 
purposes limiting the mistreatment of combatants. 
In order to protect noncombatants, the law first had to develop the 
definition of combatants.  In other words, the law had to distinguish between 
                                                                                                                   
 136 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 
Grammes Weight.  St. Petersburg, Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297, available at http:// 
www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/130?OpenDocument.  
 137 The modern rule is contained in API, supra note 2, art. 35, ¶ 2. 
 138 Id. cmt. pt. IV: § I: General Protection Against Effects of Hostilities, ¶¶ 1822, 1823 
[hereinafter Commentary], available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebPrint/470-750059-
COM?OpenDocument. 
 139 Geoffrey Best, Restraints on War on Land Before 1945, in RESTRAINTS ON WAR: STUDIES 
IN THE LIMITATION OF ARMED CONFLICTS 17, 27 (Michael Howard ed., 1979). 
 140 The modern rule is found in API, supra note 2, art. 40 (“It is prohibited to order that there 
shall be no survivors, to threaten an adversary therewith or to conduct hostilities on this 
basis.”).  
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those people and objects that were lawful targets and those people and 
objects that were not to be targeted.  The principle of distinction—which is 
fundamental to humanitarian law—once developed, could then endorse the 
notion that those persons or objects that could not be targeted should, as far 
possible, be immune from the effects of war.141 
The idea of protecting certain groups from war has ancient roots.  
Historically, most major religions developed doctrines defining the occasions 
when war was justified.142  Saint Augustine developed the Roman Catholic 
doctrine of the “just war.”143 Islamic tradition also defined when the use of 
armed force was permissible.144  Most of these traditions also exempted 
certain categories of people from the effects of war. Priests, monks, and 
friars were considered entitled to “full security against the ravages of 
war. . . .”145  Suárez argued for the exemption from death of mercenary 
soldiers taken prisoner because they could not be expected to understand the 
justness of the captor’s cause.146  The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the 
Paquete Habana case that unarmed fishing vessels were exempt from 
capture as prize of war by customary international law binding on the United 
States.147  The Court also quoted the 1785 Treaty of Amity and Commerce 
between the United States and Prussia, Article 23, which provided that if war 
broke out 
all women and children, scholars of every faculty, cultivators 
of the earth, artisans, manufacturers, and fishermen unarmed 
and inhabiting unfortified towns, villages, or places, and in 
general all others whose occupations are for the common 
subsistence and benefit of mankind, shall be allowed to 
continue their respective employments, and shall not be 
molested in their persons, nor shall their houses or goods be 
                                                                                                                   
 141 GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945, at 115 (1994); see also Prosecutor v. 
Kupreskic et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 521–522 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/tjug/en/kup-
tj000114e.pdf (noting both the prohibition on harming civilians and three notable exceptions). 
 142 See generally WILLIAM V. O’BRIEN, THE CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR (1981) 
(discussing the early just-war doctrine of St. Augustine). 
 143 See generally R.A. Markus, Saint Augustine’s Views on The “Just War,” in THE CHURCH 
AND WAR 1 (W.J. Sheils ed., 1983). 
 144 JUST WAR AND JIHAD: HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON WAR AND PEACE 
IN WESTERN AND ISLAMIC TRADITIONS 195–96 (John Kelsay & James Turner Johnson eds., 
1991). 
 145 JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE RESTRAINT OF WAR 127 (1981). 
 146 ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 69–70 (1947) 
(discussing Suárez’s study on war). 
 147 Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 708 (1900). 
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burnt or otherwise destroyed, nor their fields wasted by the 
armed force of the enemy, into whose power, by the events of 
war, they may happen to fall. . . .148 
Certain objects were also declared protected from warfare.  The Catholic 
Church, which had used its influence to protect priests and monks, was also 
successful in getting church real property and chattels protected.149  In 
Shakespeare’s Henry V, Bardolph, one of the English soldiers, is hung for 
stealing a pyx from a church.150  Although plunder and pillage of towns and 
villages was condoned and widely practiced at the time,151 Henry showed 
restraint and ordered that “there be nothing compel[ed] from the villages, 
nothing taken but paid for.”152  Theodor Meron’s marvelous article: 
Shakespeare’s Henry the Fifth and the Law of War, gives a detailed 
catalogue of the protection from war provided to persons and property in 
Medieval Europe, including church property, agricultural tools, and work 
animals.153   
2.  The Principle of Distinction 
The twentieth century saw the development of aerial bombardment, 
particularly in World War I.154  Noncombatants were exposed to the effects 
of war as never before.155  Gradually, the disparate categories of persons and 
objects protected from war evolved into the principle of distinction.  This 
principle requires the parties to armed conflict to distinguish between 
civilians and civilian objects, on the one hand, and combatants and military 
objectives on the other hand.156  Civilians and civilian objects may not be 
attacked.157  All weapons must be of a type that can “distinguish” between 
categories, meaning such weapons can be aimed so as to distinguish.158  The 
                                                                                                                   
 148 Id. at 690–91 (citing 8 Stat. 162). 
 149 Theodor Meron, Shakespeare’s Henry the Fifth and the Law of War, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 
23–24, 31–32 (1992). 
 150 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING HENRY THE FIFTH act 3, sc. 6 (R.J. Dorius ed., 1955). 
 151 Meron, supra note 147, at 32. 
 152 SHAKESPEARE, supra note 150, at act 3, sc. 6, ll. 112–113. 
 153 See generally Meron, supra note 149. 
 154 BEST, supra note 141, at 49–50. 
 155 This concern is expressed in the Commentaries to API.  “In view of the development of 
air warfare and the increasing resort to bombardment, the situation of the population remained 
a cause for concern . . . .”  Commentary, supra note 138, ¶ 1842. 
 156 API, supra note 2, art. 48; see also YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES 
UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 82–87 (2004). 
 157 API, supra note 2, art. 52, ¶ 1. 
 158 DINSTEIN, supra note 156, at 61.  
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principle of distinction is obviously dependent on a careful definition of who 
or what is counted as a combatant or military objective, as opposed to who or 
what is counted as a civilian or civilian object.  In general, combatants are 
members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict (except for religious 
and medical personnel) together with certain other persons who take a direct 
part in hostilities.159  Military objectives are defined broadly as follows: 
those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use 
make an effective contribution to military action and whose 
total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the 
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military 
advantage.160  
Civilians are those people who take no direct part in hostilities and are not 
members of the armed forces.161  If civilians take an active or direct part in 
hostilities, they lose their civilian status and all attendant protections.162  
Civilian objects are defined as any object that is not a military object.163  The 
war contexts to which these definitions apply are also important. 
Although the principle of distinction was developed in the context of 
inter-state warfare, it is increasingly accepted that, by custom, this distinction 
also applies to internal armed conflict.164  The Red Cross study of 
international humanitarian law discusses twenty-four rules under the heading 
“The Principle of Distinction.”165  Two of these rules, rules 3 and 4, which 
define “armed forces of a party to the conflict,” only apply to international 
armed conflict (IAC).  Of the remaining twenty-two rules, nineteen are 
firmly held to apply in both IAC and non-international armed conflict 
(NIAC).  The remaining three rules are listed as applicable in IAC and 
arguably applicable in NIAC.166  The rules falling under the general category 
                                                                                                                   
 159 GIII, supra note 11, art. 4(A)(1)–(2), (B). 
 160 API, supra note 2, art. 52, ¶ 2. 
 161 DINSTEIN, supra note 156, at 113. 
 162 API, supra note 2, art. 51, ¶ 3; see also Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion 
of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law, 90 INT’L REV. 
RED CROSS 991, 994 (2008). 
 163 API, supra note 2, art. 52, ¶ 1. 
 164 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, I CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, ch. 
1 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter Henckaerts & 
Doswald-Beck]. 
 165 Id. at pt. I. 
 166 Id.  “Arguably applicable” is explained as follows: “[S]ome rules are indicated as being 
‘arguably’ applicable because practice generally pointed in that direction but was less 
extensive.” Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A 
Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87 
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of “The Principle of Distinction” include not only the generally required 
distinction discussed above, but also the prohibition on indiscriminate 
attacks, the collateral damage rule, the rules on precautions in attack, and 
precautions against the effects of attack and also the Rules on specifically 
protected persons.167 
3.  The Formulation of the Collateral Damage Rule  
It was always understood that although civilians and civilian objects may 
not be attacked, the nature of warfare being what it is, some civilians and 
civilian objects might be killed, injured, or destroyed incidental to an attack 
on a military target.  In order to afford even greater protection to civilians 
and civilian objects, a number of other rules were developed. 
  a.  The Prohibition on Indiscriminate Attacks 
Indiscriminate attacks are those attacks which are either not directed 
against combatants or military objectives or are unable to distinguish 
between military personnel and military objectives, and civilian personnel 
and civilian objects.168  Such attacks are prohibited, as are attacks that treat as 
a single military objective different military objectives located in an area 
interspersed by concentrations of civilians, such as cities and towns.169  This 
rule is applicable in both IAC and NIAC.170 
  b.  Proportionality in Attack 
The jus in bello proportionality rule, discussed above in the introduction 
to Part IV and now codified in Additional Protocol I (API), Article 51(5)(b), 
is another rule providing broader protection to civilians and civilian objects 
in IAC.  The weight of scholarly opinion also finds this rule applicable in 
NIAC.171  The rule prohibits launching an attack on a military target “which 
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
                                                                                                                   
Int’l Rev. Red Cross 175, 198, Annex (2005). 
 167 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 164, at pt. I. 
 168 API, supra note 2, art. 51, ¶¶ 4–5. 
 169 Id.  
 170 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 164, at 43. 
 171 Id. at Rule 14; see Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 524 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Jan 14, 2000) (discussing proportional attacks in 
a case involving the internal conflict between Muslims and Croats in Bosnia). 
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anticipated.”172  Attacks where the collateral civilian damage is expected to 
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated are classified as indiscriminate attacks.173   
  c.  Precautions in Attack 
The rules regarding precautions in attack call upon the parties to do 
everything possible to minimize civilian casualties.174  They must make 
every effort to verify that a target is a military target rather than a civilian or 
civilian object.175  Parties must assess whether an attack may be expected to 
cause incidental death or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects that 
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated.  If it is discovered that the target is not a legitimate military 
target or that civilian injury, death, or damage would be excessive, the attack 
must be canceled or suspended.176  Where any civilian loss or damage is 
expected, advance warning must be given,177 and when there is a choice of 
targets, the target likely to cause the least civilian loss or damage must be 
selected.178 
  d.  Precautions Against the Effects of Attacks 
The rules concerning precautions against the effects of attacks require 
parties to a conflict to protect civilians and civilian objects from the dangers 
of military operations.  They must try to remove civilians and civilian objects 
from the area where military targets are located.179  Similarly, a party’s 
military objects must not be located in densely populated civilian areas.180 
C.  Criticisms of, and Problems with, the Collateral Damage Rule  
Ever since the collateral damage rule was articulated it has been subject to 
a variety of criticisms.  Problems with how to weigh expected civilian 
casualties or civilian property damage against anticipated concrete and direct 
                                                                                                                   
 172 API, supra note 2, art. 51, ¶ 5(b); Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 164, at 46. 
 173 API, supra note 2, art. 51, ¶ 5(b). 
 174 Id. art. 57, ¶ 2(a)(i); Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 164, at 51–67 (listing the 
rules on precautions in attack). 
 175 API, supra note 2, art. 57, ¶ 2(a)(i). 
 176 Id. art. 57, ¶¶ 2(a)(iii)–(b). 
 177 Id. art. 57, ¶ 2(c). 
 178 Id. art. 57, ¶ 3. 
 179 Id. art. 58(a). 
 180 Id. art. 58(b); Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 164, at 71. 
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military advantage were perhaps predictable.  Professor Gary Solis sums up 
the dilemma starkly: “On the battlefield, how is a commander to balance 
human life against the destruction of an enemy target? How can human lives 
be compared to ‘things’?  That is the terrible and impossible problem of 
proportionality.”181  Questions about how to assess “excessive” civilian 
damage were quickly posed, and difficulties about whether the assessment of 
military advantage should relate to one attack, a series of attacks, or a whole 
campaign were debated.182  The Commentaries to API (Commentaries) try to 
tackle some of these issues but with commendable honesty confess that the 
text “is not always as clear as one might have wished.”183  They add, perhaps 
as an excuse, that “it seemed necessary to leave some margin of appreciation 
to those who will have to apply the rules.  Thus their effectiveness will 
depend to a large extent on the good faith of the belligerents and on their 
wish to conform to the requirements of humanity.”184  Good faith, of course, 
is required in the interpretation and performance of all treaties185 but if the 
terms of the treaty leave open a variety of possible interpretations, good faith 
will not ensure uniform application.  Again with respect to putting these 
provisions into practice, the Commentaries call for “complete good faith on 
the part of the belligerents, as well as the desire to conform with the general 
principle of respect for the civilian population.”186  
Some issues are resolved by the Commentaries.  To the suggestion that 
API, Article 51(5)(b) might authorize any type of attack provided civilian 
losses were not excessive in relation to military advantage, the 
Commentaries boldly state that “[t]his theory is manifestly incorrect.”187  
They further point out that “the attack must be directed against a military 
objective with means which are not disproportionate in relation to the 
objective.”188  In other situations, the Commentaries acknowledge more 
ambiguity.  On the issues of weighing civilian losses against military 
advantage, there are admitted problems: “Of course, the disproportion 
between losses and damages caused and the military advantages anticipated 
raises a delicate problem; in some situations there will be no room for doubt, 
while in other situations there may be reason for hesitation.  In such 
                                                                                                                   
 181 SOLIS, supra note 4, at 273. 
 182 See Commentary, supra note 138, ¶ 1976 (noting much discussion about the nature of 
Article 5 attacks when analyzed in relations to “concrete military advantage”). 
 183 Id. ¶ 1835. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 26, 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331. 
 186 Commentary, supra note 138, ¶ 1978. 
 187 Id. ¶ 1979. 
 188 Id. 
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situations the interests of the civilian population should prevail. . . .”189  This 
comment does not exactly tell us what qualifies as “excessive” civilian 
losses, but it does offer guidance in some situations.  William Fenrick’s 
excellent article reviewing the development of API’s articles on 
proportionality concludes that attacks are clearly excessive when there is 
clear evidence that such attacks were actually directed against civilians, “but 
how much higher the standard is to be drawn is unclear.”190  The late Leslie 
Green also concludes that “there is no definition as to what is 
‘excessive.’ ”191 
The question of whether military advantage should be weighed against 
civilian damage for each individual attack, or on a cumulative basis of many 
attacks, or perhaps a whole campaign, has spawned different answers.  
Professor Farer argues that using the cumulative approach could have dire 
consequences for civilians.192 Professor Gardam thinks that the words 
concrete and direct, in conjunction with military advantage, indicate “that 
the Protocol requires that proportionality be assessed in relation to each 
individual attack, rather than on a cumulative basis.”193  Professor Dinstein 
generally concludes that proportionality “has to be calculated in relation to a 
given attack, rather than on an ongoing cumulative footing.”194  However, he 
cautions that “[i]f an extensive air campaign is undertaken, it would be 
mistaken to focus on the outcome of an isolated sortie.”195  The Statute of the 
International Criminal Court includes in its list of war crimes the intentional 
launch of an attack done with the knowledge that the likely collateral civilian 
damage will be “clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
overall military advantage anticipated.”196  The assessment in light of overall 
military advantage appears to require a broader scope than simply one 
individual attack.  Leslie Green seems to propose that either a limited 
campaign or the overall war effort can be an acceptable mode of assessment: 
“[T]he definition whether an objective is legitimate or not, depends upon the 
                                                                                                                   
 189 Id. 
 190 William J. Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional Warfare, 
98 MIL. L. REV. 91, 102 (1982). 
 191 LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 391 (3d ed. 2008).  
Green continues: “The decision must be made in accordance with reasonable assessments and 
expectations. . . .” Id. 
 192 Tom J. Farer, The Laws of War 25 Years After Nuremberg, 39 INT’L CONCILIATION 1, 
16–17 (May 1971). 
 193 Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 
391, 407 (1993). 
 194 DINSTEIN, supra note 156, at 123. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8, ¶ 2(b)(iv), adopted July 17, 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (emphasis added). 
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contribution an attack upon that object will make to ultimate victory [i.e. the 
entire war effort] or the success of the operation of which the attack is part 
[i.e. the particular campaign within the wider war].”197 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
has tackled the issue of whether the single or cumulative attack approach to 
proportionality is appropriate.  In Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., the Tribunal 
engaged in a general discussion of the protection of civilians in armed 
conflict, recognizing that “deliberate attacks on civilians or civilian objects 
are absolutely prohibited by international humanitarian law.”198  It 
nonetheless mentioned three exceptions to this general proscription including 
unavoidable collateral damage to civilians.199  The Tribunal discussed the 
principle of proportionality and the Martens Clause200 which requires the 
application of “principles of humanity” and the “dictates of public 
conscience” in cases not covered by treaties or, as the Tribunal states, “when 
interpreting and applying loose international rules.”201  Weaving together the 
proportionality rule and the Martens Clause, the Tribunal considered whether 
a group of individual attacks that might each meet the proportionality 
requirements, might nevertheless be found violative of the laws of armed 
conflict when looked at cumulatively: 
As an example of the way in which the Martens Clause may be 
utilised, regard might be had to considerations such as the 
cumulative effect of attacks on military objectives causing 
incidental damage to civilians.  In other words, it may happen 
that single attacks on military objectives causing incidental 
damage to civilians, although they may raise doubts as to their 
lawfulness, nevertheless do not appear on their face to fall foul 
per se  of the loose prescriptions of Articles 57 and 58 [of API] 
(or of the corresponding customary rules).  However, in case of 
repeated attacks, all or most of them falling within the grey 
area between indisputable legality and unlawfulness, it might 
                                                                                                                   
 197 GREEN, supra note 191. 
 198 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 521 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
For the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000). 
 199 Id. ¶ 522. 
 200 The Martens Clause was first included in the 1899 Preamble to Hague Convention II 
with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (available at: http://icrc.org/ihl.nsf/ 
FULL/150?OpenDocument) and now appears in all four Geneva Conventions and in API and 
APII with slightly varying language.  GI, supra note 11, art. 63; GII, supra note 11, art. 62; 
GIII, supra note 11, art. 142; GIV, supra note 11, art. 158; API, supra note 2, art. 1, ¶ 2; APII, 
supra note 6, pmbl. 
 201 Kupreškić et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, ¶¶ 524, 525. 
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be warranted to conclude that the cumulative effect of such acts 
entails that they may not be in keeping with international law.  
Indeed, this pattern of military conduct may turn out to 
jeopardise excessively the lives and assets of civilians, contrary 
to the demands of humanity.202  
The Tribunal’s discussion in Kupreškić might well lead any military 
commander with authority over a broad geographic area of conflict to believe 
that having subordinate commanders of individual attacks engage in 
proportionality assessments for each attack might relieve those subordinate 
commanders of criminal responsibility (unless they knew or should have 
known of the likely effects of the overall campaign) but might not protect the 
commander of the overall campaign. 
Yet another proportionality issue, regarding the effect of high value 
targets on assessing overall military advantage, has proved troublesome.  
Since the rule calls for balancing civilian damage against military advantage, 
naturally enough people have asked what happens to this balancing when it 
is agreed that eliminating a particular military object or combatant has an 
extremely high value and would result in considerable military advantage 
even though many civilians may have to be killed in the process.  In other 
words, are more civilian deaths and injury or greater damage to civilian 
property permitted because a high value target is perceived to increase the 
military advantage?  Dinstein accepts that the higher the military value the 
target holds (necessarily a subjective judgment), the higher the acceptable 
number of civilian losses: 
Even extensive civilian casualties may be acceptable, if they 
are not excessive in light of the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated.  The bombing of an important army or 
naval installation (like a naval shipyard) where there are 
hundreds or even thousands of civilian employees need not be 
abandoned merely because of the risk to those civilians.203 
Solis, however, gives several hypothetical and real examples illustrating 
the problem of the changing ratio of civilian deaths when compared with 
military advantage.  He asks the following questions:  
                                                                                                                   
 202 Id. ¶ 526. 
 203 DINSTEIN, supra note 156, at 121. 
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[H]ow many noncombatant lives would be acceptable forfeit 
for the targeting and killing of Saddam Hussein and his two 
sons, the three of whom were legitimate military targets?  
Would the anticipated direct military advantage gained by their 
deaths, while the international armed conflict was still in 
progress, mitigate the deaths of ten civilians? Twenty? A 
hundred?204  
In April 2003, U.S. forces dropped four satellite-guided bombs on a Baghdad 
neighborhood, missing the targeted restaurant and killing as many as 
fourteen civilians based on apparently incorrect information that Saddam and 
his sons were at the location.205  Was the attack disproportional?  The May 1, 
2011 killing of the Al Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden, was apparently 
accomplished by storming the compound where he lived in Abbotabad, 
Pakistan, with only four other deaths of compound residents who may or 
may not have been entitled to civilian status.206  Suppose instead that reliable 
information had finally tracked bin Laden to the compound and U.S. forces 
had decided to bomb the compound killing bin Laden but also killing fifty 
civilians, injuring sixty more and razing twenty houses in the adjacent area.  
Would such an attack be disproportional? Solis, apparently admitting the 
insolubility of the ratio calculation, commented: “Such calculations are one 
of the burdens of high military command.”207  
In some recent wars, the outrage produced by any civilian deaths has been 
so great that military commanders have used rules of engagement that are 
                                                                                                                   
 204 SOLIS, supra note 4, at 278. 
 205 David Blair, Smart Bombs Aimed at Saddam Killed Families, Telegraph (Apr. 21, 2003), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleast/Iraq/1428061/Smart-bombs-aimed-at-
Saddam-killed-familes.html; Jack Gruber, U.S. Bombs Site after Intelligence Says Saddam 
Was Meeting There, USA TODAY (Apr. 7, 2003), http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/Iraq/ 
2003-04-07-war-main_x.htm. 
 206 Those dead were reported as one of bin Laden’s sons, two of his brothers, and one of his  
wives.  Scott Wilson et al., Osama bin Laden Killed in U.S. Raid, Buried at Sea, WASH. POST  
(May 2, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/osama-bin-laden-killed-in-us-raid-bu  
ried-at-sea/2011/05/02/AFx0yAZf_story.html.  The issue of whether bin Laden was given the  
opportunity to surrender has been widely discussed.  Even though Obama administration  
members have said that they were prepared “to take bin Laden into custody, if it were possible 
to do so”; Steve Coll states that the claim that capturing bin Laden was part of the Navy Seals’  
ROEs “is not easy to reconcile with the on-site decision to shoot bullets into his writhing  
body.”  Steve Coll, Dead or Alive, N.Y. REV. OF BKS, Oct. 25, 2012, available at http://www.  
nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/oct/25/bin-laden-dead-or-alive/?pageniation=false; Raffi  
Khatchadourian, Bin Laden: The Rules of Engagement,NEW YORKER (May 4, 2011), http://  
www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2011/05/bin-laden-the-rules-of-engagement. 
html. 
 207 SOLIS, supra note 4, at 280. 
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considerably stricter than required by proportionality.208  Before the internet, 
smart phones, and the ever growing battery of social media communication 
systems, the only people that would likely know what happened in a 
particular attack or campaign in remote areas were those directly involved.  
Even in populated areas, the number of people with knowledge of the event 
would likely be very limited.  That has now changed fundamentally.  First, it 
seems as if almost no act, however small and possibly insignificant, takes 
place outside the range of some recording system.  As soon as there is an 
explosion, riot, or weapon discharge, photographs and sound recordings 
rapidly find their way onto all sorts of media outlets, and soon the whole 
world can view the event.209  This phenomenon allows civil society to 
express its views as never before; the death of one civilian can mobilize 
thousands.210  During the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, civilian deaths were 
antagonizing the Iraqi population to a great extent.  United States policy at 
the time was to have the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, personally 
approve any attack where it was estimated that thirty or more civilians might 
be killed.211 
More recently, civilian deaths in Afghanistan have been viewed as so 
antithetical to the overall military mission that the Rules of Engagement 
(ROE) have severely limited attacks where any civilian deaths are 
expected.212  Colonel Clay Hall, who has served in both Iraq and 
                                                                                                                   
 208 See infra note 212. 
 209 For example, the riots following the self-immolation of a Tunisian fruit and vegetable 
seller were posted on Facebook and led to further riots in Tunisia and elsewhere. Witnesses 
Report Rioting in Tunisian Town, REUTERS (Dec. 19, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2 
010/12/19/ozatp-tunisia-riot-idAFJOEB106U20101219; Tunisia: 11 Die in New Clashes After 
Weeks of Unrest, GUARDIAN (Jan. 9, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/09/Tu 
nisia-clashes-weeks-unrest. 
 210 In December 2010, a Tunisian man burned himself to death in protest after police 
confiscated the fruit and vegetables he was selling; that act is widely seen as giving rise to the 
revolt in Tunisia and other Arab nations.  Gary Blight et al., Arab Spring: An Interactive 
Timeline of Middle East Protests, GUARDIAN (Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/ 
interactive/2011/mar/22/middle-east-protest-interactive-timeline. 
 211 Michael R. Gordon & Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II 89 (2006). 
 212 The ROE for troops in Afghanistan are classified but were widely reported as put in place 
by General Stanley McChrystal in 2009 and were aimed at limiting civilian casualties.  
Petraeus to Modify Afghanistan Rules of Engagement, Source Says, FOXNEWS.COM (June 25, 
2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/06/25/petreus-modify-afghanistan-rules-engage 
ment-source-says/.  Some military factions complained about the ROEs, which they claimed 
“have effectively forced the troops to fight with one hand tied behind their backs.”  Id.  These 
ROEs were apparently revised in February 2010 to further limit tactical warfare.  Sarah 
Holewinski & James Morin, Afghanistan War: New Rules of Engagement Don’t Pit Civilians 
vs. Soldiers, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 10, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/Comment 
ary/Opinion/2010/0310/Afghanistan-war-New-rules-of-engagement-don-t-pit-civilians-vs.-sol 
diers. 
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Afghanistan, has reportedly stated that once the goal is articulated as 
stabilizing the country “it’s pretty hard to do that when you’re dropping 
bombs on innocent people.”213  
A recent United Nations report states that civilian deaths and injuries in 
Afghanistan rose by 15% from 2009 to 2010.214  The figures are revealing: 
“There were 2,777 conflict-related civilian deaths in 2010 . . . .”215  Of 
course, pro-government forces216 are only responsible for a limited 
proportion of such deaths and injuries, and it is estimated that the proportion 
of civilians killed by the pro-government forces has in fact declined from 
26% in 2009 to 16% in 2010.217  The U.N. Report, which was issued in 
March 2011, concludes that the number of civilian deaths has risen from 
1,523 in 2007 to 2,777 in 2010.218  In 2010, anti-government elements219 
were estimated to be responsible for 2,080 of the civilian deaths, pro-
government forces were responsible for 440 deaths, and 257 deaths were 
unattributable to any faction.220 
There has been much written about the suggestion that collateral damage 
is reduced through the use of precision weapons, particularly unmanned 
                                                                                                                   
 213 Anna Mulrine, How Afghanistan Civilian Deaths Have Changed the Way the US Military 
Fights, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 27, 2011), http://csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2011/ 
0727/How-Afghanistan-civilian-deaths-have-changed-the-way-the-US-military-fights. 
 214 U.N. Assistance Mission in Afg., Afghanistan Annual Report on Protection of Civilians 
in Armed Conflict 2010, 27–28 (Mar. 2011), http://unana.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/ 
human%20rights/March%20PoC%20Annual%20Report%20Final.pdf.  
 215 Citing Rising Death Toll, UN Urges Better Protection of Afghan Civilians, UN NEWS 
CENTRE (Mar. 9, 2011), http//www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37715&Cr=Afghan 
&Cr1#.UF8_eaTyZqc; U.N. Assistance Mission in Afg., supra note 214, at 57. 
 216 The U.N. Report defines as Pro-Government Forces (PGF) as follows:  
Afghan Government Forces.  All forces that act in all military or paramilitary 
counter-insurgency operations and are directly or indirectly under the control 
of the Government of Afghanistan.  These forces include, but are not limited 
to, the ANA [Afghan National Army], ANP [Afghan National Police], the 
Afghan Border Police (ABP) and the NDS [National Directorate of Security, 
Afghanistan’s state intelligence service]. 
UN NEWS CENTRE, supra note 215, glossary. 
 217 Id. at i. 
 218 Id. at 57. 
 219 The U.N. Report defines Anti-Government Elements (AGE) as follows:  
[A]ll individuals and armed groups currently involved in armed conflict 
against the Government of Afghanistan and/or international military forces.  
They include those who identify as “Taliban” as well as individuals and 
groups motivated by a range of objectives and assuming a variety of labels 
including the Haqqani network, Hezb-e-Islami and al-Qaida affiliates such as 
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Jihad Union, Lashkari Tayyiba 
and Jaysh Muhammad. 
Id. glossary. 
 220 Id. at 57. 
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drones.221  The legality of drone attacks, sometimes operated by non-military 
personnel, in countries that may not have given permission for such attacks, 
and that target specific people, is beyond the scope of this article.222  
However, it is important to note that the accuracy of reports suggesting 
minimal civilian damage resulting from such attacks has been challenged,223 
and in any event, the overall statistics for civilian deaths and injury generally 
remain disproportionate to military deaths and injury, even in wars that 
employ such weapons.224  
D.  Does the Collateral Damage Rule Require a Direct Causal Link from 
Military Attack to Civilian Death or Damage to Violate the Rule? 
Causation is a slippery concept that has tested philosophers and scientist 
for centuries.  This Article is not intended to enter into debate about the 
complex meaning of causation in various contexts.  In general, if one action 
brings about a result or effect that would not otherwise have occurred, then 
the result or effect is said to have been caused by the earlier action.  It is 
recognized that some effects or results are directly caused by the earlier 
event and that some effects or results come about by a combination of factors 
so that the earlier event may be said to be only an indirect cause of the later 
results.  This general understanding of causation is quite sufficient for 
discussing causation in relation to the collateral damage rule largely because 
civilian loss and damage only needs to be incidental to the attack on the 
military target to fall within the ambit of the rule.225  
Most of the war casualty figures, cited in Part III.C above, include 
military deaths and civilian deaths occurring as a direct result of combat.226  
Some of the figures include other forms of military deaths, such as from 
                                                                                                                   
 221 E.g., Jane Mayer, The Predator War, NEW YORKER, Oct. 26, 2009, at 36, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer (discussing the risk 
of using unmanned drones to target terrorists). 
 222 See generally Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case 
Study of Pakistan, 2004–2009 (Notre Dame Legal Studies Paper No. 09-43, 2010), available 
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Aug. 11, 2012, at A1 (noting that the number of civilian casualties in drone strikes reported by 
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 224 See Part III.C. 
 225 API, supra note 2, art. 51, ¶ 5(b). 
 226 See, e.g., Lacina & Gleditsch, supra note 51, at 148. 
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disease,227 and civilian deaths, such as from general violence, social 
disruption, or famine associated with war.228  An argument may be made that 
the military cannot be held responsible for all the civilian deaths, injury, and 
damage that may result from the general consequences of war and that the 
laws of war do not ascribe culpability to the military for such overall civilian 
losses.  The statisticians that compile battle-deaths for civilians, clearly 
intend to imply that the civilian deaths and damage were caused directly by 
combat.229  Figures relating to deaths caused by disease, famine, and general 
disruption are also clearly compiled by those who see these consequences as 
emanating from military engagements.230   
When considering inter-state wars, which involve only armed forces of 
opposing states, it is easy to pin-point the civilian death and destruction 
resulting from military attacks.  When dealing with intra-state wars, 
particularly where there are several armed factions fighting, it may be 
difficult to determine which armed faction caused the particular civilian 
destruction; nevertheless the fighting has led to the civilian devastation.231  
Thus it may be concluded that civilian death and destruction come about as a 
result of war.  Some deaths occur immediately as a result of battle.  Some 
occur later, such as death from battle injuries and infection.  Some take even 
longer to develop, such as deaths from widespread famine caused by general 
societal disruption in the wake of war.  However, in a general sense, all of 
these statistics indicate that the civilian deaths, injuries, and property damage 
have been caused by war. 
One interesting aspect of the collateral damage rule is that it does not 
prohibit direct targeting of civilians.232  That is prohibited elsewhere in 
API.233  What the rule prohibits in connection with attacks on military targets 
is “incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian 
objects, or a combination thereof,” when such losses are expected to “be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
                                                                                                                   
 227 Clemens & Singer, supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 228 See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text. 
 229 See, e.g., Lacina & Gleditsch, supra note 51, at 148 (explaining that to limit studies to 
combatant deaths could seriously underplay the effects of war). 
 230 E.g., WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, supra note 83, at 218; Murray et al., supra note 83. 
 231 Studies demonstrate that overall societal violence rises during war, leading to more 
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the end of conflict.  JORIS VOORHOEVE, FROM WAR TO THE RULE OF LAW: PEACE BUILDING 
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 232 API, supra note 2. 
 233 “The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of 
attack.”  Id.  art. 51, ¶ 2. 
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anticipated.”234  The word incidental is significant but is not addressed, as 
such, by the Commentaries.  What do we understand from the word 
incidental when applied to the “loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects or a combination thereof” that might be expected 
to result from a legitimate attack on a military target?   
Dictionaries, prosaic though they are, may prove useful in aiding our 
understanding of the word incidental.  The Oxford English Dictionary 
defines incidental as follows:  
1.a. Occurring or liable to occur in fortuitous or subordinate 
conjunction with something else of which it forms no essential 
part; casual.235   
The American Heritage Dictionary of The English Language has a similar 
definition: 
1.  Occurring or likely to occur as an unpredictable or minor 
consequence. . . . 
2.  Of a minor, casual, or subordinate nature. . . .236 
Collins English Dictionary has three relevant definitions of incidental: 
1.  happening in connection with or resulting from something 
more important; casual or fortuitous 
2.  . . . found in connection (with); related (to) 
3.  . . . caused (by).237 
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary entry has two definitions: 
 1. a: being likely to ensue as a chance or minor 
consequence . . . . 
 2. occurring merely by chance or without intention or 
calculation.238 
                                                                                                                   
 234 Id. art. 51, ¶ 5(b). 
 235 VII OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 794 (2d ed. 1989), available at http://www.oed.com/ 
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This dictionary also lists synonyms for “incidental”: 
Synonym: casual, chance, fluky (also flukey), fortuitous, 
inadvertent, unintentional, unplanned, unpremeditated, 
unwitting.239 
It is worth noting that, with the exception of the third definition in Collins 
English Dictionary, none of the above definitions indicates direct causation 
from one event to the next.  From this we may confidently conclude that the 
overwhelming consensus on the definition of incidental is that although an 
incidental event will follow an earlier event (military attack) or be associated 
with it, there is no requirement that the civilian death or damage incidental to 
the military attack be caused directly by the military attack to be prohibited.  
Rather, any civilian death, injury or damage that “occur[s] in fortuitous or 
subordinate conjunction with . . . [a military attack] of which it forms no 
essential part. . . .”;240 occurs “as an unpredictable or minor 
consequences . . . .”241 of a military attack; or happens “in connection 
with”242 a military attack, is incidental to the military attack and thus falls 
within the scope of the collateral damage rule.243  All of the civilian loss 
statistics quoted in Part III.C.3 certainly fall within the definition of 
occurrences incidental to military attacks.  In any war, therefore, where the 
ratio of civilian to military deaths is at least equal, such consequences are 
surely excessive given the clear understanding expressed in the 
Commentaries that “[i]ncidental losses and damages should never be 
extensive”244 no matter what the military advantage might be.   
E.  Conclusion on the Protection Afforded to Civilians by the Collateral 
Damage Rule 
Despite the many interpretational and operational problems with the 
collateral damage rule, there is little doubt that it is meant to provide 
protection from military attacks on civilians beyond what is required by the 
basic rule of discrimination and the prohibition on targeting civilians or 
civilian objects, or that it does so in a context where military and civilian 
                                                                                                                   
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/incidental. 
 239 Id.  
 240 VII OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 235. 
 241 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 236. 
 242 COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 237. 
 243 See sources cited supra notes 172–75.  
 244 Commentary, supra note 138, ¶ 1980, and text at infra notes 254–56.   
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targets are intermeshed.  Nonetheless, in an era when civilian war-related 
deaths are recorded as disproportionate to military deaths,  the continuing 
validity of the rule demands further examination.245  Even in an era when 
high precision weapons may, in some instances, reduce civilian collateral 
damage,246 the overall civilian toll from warfare belies the notion that civilian 
war-related deaths and injuries are simply incidental (or collateral) to 
legitimate military destruction and death. 
V.  THE REGULATORY EFFECT OF THE COLLATERAL DAMAGE RULE IN 
LIGHT OF ITS OVERALL FAILED PURPOSE 
A.  Introduction 
This Article has examined the collateral damage rule in light of the 
changing nature of warfare and the shifting ratios of military to civilian war-
related deaths.  If the overall purpose of the collateral damage rule is to 
protect civilians from attack in circumstances where some civilian damage 
may be expected, the rule does not seem to be working very well.  This part 
of the Article will examine the purpose of the collateral damage rule viewed 
both narrowly and broadly.  It will then examine the general question: What 
happens to legal rules that cannot effectuate their overall purposes?  Finally, 
this section includes suggestions about what should happen to the collateral 
damage rule. 
B.  The Purposes of the Collateral Damage Rule Viewed Narrowly and 
Broadly 
The title to API, Article 51 is “Protection of the Civilian Population.”247  
Civilians are meant to “enjoy general protection against dangers arising from 
military operations.”248  The rules that follow in the various succeeding 
paragraphs are designed “[t]o give effect to this protection.”249  Civilians 
may not be the object of an attack250 and indiscriminate attacks are 
prohibited.251  Various types of indiscriminate attacks are described, 
including those that violate the collateral damage rule.252  An attack which 
                                                                                                                   
 245 See supra Parts III.C.2, III.C.3.b. 
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“may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated” is prohibited as indiscriminate.253   
The official Commentaries to Article 51, paragraph 5(b) have already 
been mentioned254 but it is worth adding that the Commentaries explored the 
possibility that very high civilian death and damage might “be justified if the 
military advantage at stake is of great importance.”255  The response to this 
suggestion was quite clear that such a view is not correct: 
This idea is contrary to the fundamental rules of the Protocol; 
in particular it conflicts with Article 48 ‘(Basic Rule)’ 
[principle of distinction] and with paragraphs 1 and 2 of the 
present Article 51 [general protection for civilians from 
dangers of military operations and prohibition on attacking 
civilians and on acts of violence to spread terror among 
civilians].  The Protocol does not provide any justification for 
attacks which cause extensive civilian losses and damages.  
Incidental losses and damages should never be extensive.256   
Dinstein accuses some commentators of “confus[ing] the term ‘excessive’ 
with ‘extensive’ ”257 and cites Claude Pilloud’s and Jean Pictet’s 
Commentary on the Additional Protocols.258  Dinstein calls this a textual 
misreading.259  He concludes that: “Even extensive civilian casualties may be 
acceptable, if they are not excessive in light of the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated.”260  While Dinstein is correct that the text of 
API, Article 51, paragraph 5(b) uses the term excessive, Pilloud and Pictet 
were quite well aware of the language of the text but were making the point 
quoted above, namely, that even if the military advantage is great, extensive 
civilian casualties are never justified and always considered excessive.261   
Certainly, some civilian death and damage is permissible under the rule, 
but it was quite clear that the application of the collateral damage rule was 
never expected to result in ratios where civilian deaths outnumber military 
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deaths, or even where civilian and military deaths are equal.  Civilian 
damage that could predictably outweigh military damage, sometimes by 
several multiples, was intended to be beyond the scope of permissible 
military activity.   
Area bombardment wherein distinct military objects are located among 
concentrations of civilians and civilian objects is prohibited by API, Article 
51, paragraph 5(a).262  The commentary on this subparagraph makes specific 
reference to “carpet bombing or saturation bombing.”263  It also noted that 
there were many examples of such bombings in WWII and that they were 
characterized by “destroy[ing] all life in a specific area and raz[ing] to the 
ground all buildings situated there.”264  The collateral damage rule, operating 
in concert with other protections of civilians found in this section of API, 
made such activity illegal. 
The collateral damage rule, even if interpreted narrowly as only 
addressing each particular attack,265 was never meant to permit extensive 
civilian damage even if the military advantage was great.  Particular attacks 
where the civilian damage is not extensive and the military advantage is 
concrete and direct might meet the rule’s requirements, but if either the 
overall campaign or the war itself results in extensive civilian death, injury 
and damage, the collateral damage rule will have been violated.  The narrow 
object of the rule is to protect civilians exposed to injury as part of a specific 
attack on a military target.  The broad object of the rule is to ensure that wars 
do not result in extensive civilian deaths and damage.  Where wars result in 
extensive civilian losses, which they almost always do, the collateral damage 
rule will have been violated many times. 
C.  The Fate of Legal Rules That Cannot Fulfill Their Overall Purposes 
What happens to legal rules that are frequently violated and perceived as 
unable to fulfill their purposes?  All law faces the problem of inefficacy, and 
we might look for solutions in a wide range of topics and eras.  A few 
random examples will set the stage for thinking about approaches to this 
dilemma.  Sometimes statutes in the area of criminal law remain on the 
books but are simply never enforced.  Fornication, even between consenting 
adults, remains an offense in many developed states, but one looks in vain 
for its prosecution, except in theocratic states.266  In these cases we speak of 
                                                                                                                   
 262 API, supra note 2, art. 51, ¶ 5(a). 
 263 Commentary, supra note 138, ¶ 1968. 
 264 Id. 
 265 But see supra notes 192–202 (noting the tendency to reject this approach).  
 266 E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-104 (West 1953).  Until recently, fornication was also a 
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the law falling into desuetude.  Eventually, it gets removed from the statute 
books. 
Sometimes a rule is seen as both ineffective and encouraging other 
undesired consequences.  In the United States, abortion was prohibited 
before 1973; performing or submitting to an abortion was a criminal offense 
except in certain instances to save the mother’s life.267  When the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled in Roe v. Wade268 that abortions could not be prohibited 
prior to roughly the last trimester of pregnancy, it did so for a number of 
reasons.  Principally, the Court ruled that the mother’s constitutionally 
protected right to privacy trumped any right to future life that the non-viable 
fetus might be thought to possess.269  Other considerations were also 
persuasive.  Evidence was presented to the Court showing “high mortality 
rates at illegal ‘abortion mills.’ ”270  Clearly, the prohibition of abortion was 
not working and brought in its wake the unintended consequences of killing 
a large number of women every year.  As a result, abortion prior to the final 
trimester of pregnancy is now usually permitted, but must be carried out in 
regulated medical establishments.271 
Moving away from the criminal context, the area of treaty law also 
provides some insight.  Until recently, virtually every U.S. extradition treaty 
contained a political offense exception basically stating that a fugitive from 
justice would not be extradited for political offenses.272  The classic 
definition of the political offense is that a person has engaged in a crime in 
the course of trying to overthrow an existing government and put another 
government in its place.273  Such crimes could include killing police officers, 
or blowing up army barracks, or a whole variety of other violent crimes 
against the state.  After it was pointed out that the United States almost never 
                                                                                                                   
criminal offense in Virginia, but the statute was struck down as violation of the Due Process 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution in Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367 (Va. 2005).  For examples 
of theocratic states criminalizing fornication, see Punishment for Non-Marital Sex in Islam: 
Examples of Convictions Under Sharia Law, which is available at http://www.religiousintoler 
ance.org/isl_adu1.htm (last updated Sept. 26, 2002). 
 267 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1191–1194, 1196 (West 1971), declared unconstitutional by 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 268 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 269 Id. at 153–54, 163–64. 
 270 Id. at 150. 
 271 Id. at 163–65. 
 272 E.g., Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and 
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, U.S.-U.K., art. 
V(1)(c), June 9, 1972, 28 U.S.T. 227. 
 273 See Valerie Epps, Abolishing the Political Offense Exception, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 203, 204–05 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1988) (noting that the 
exception developed as a response to revolutionary action and was meant to excuse crimes 
deemed acceptable only because of the political beliefs of the offender). 
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entered into extradition treaties with another state unless the two shared 
roughly the same political values, it was seen as foolish to refuse to extradite 
someone who attempted to overthrow a government that basically has the 
same political system and values as the United States.274  As a result, over the 
last thirty years, the United States has been systematically dropping the 
political offense exception clause from most of its extradition treaties. 
In the area of weapons conventions, there are two cardinal rules.  First, 
the weapon must be able to distinguish between military personnel and 
objects, on the one hand, and civilian personnel and objects, on the other 
hand.275  Second, the weapon must never cause unnecessary suffering to 
combatants or anyone else.276  Where a weapon is shown to violate one, or 
both, of these cardinal rules, the international community will draft a treaty 
and the weapon will be banned.277   
Applying any of the solutions listed above to the collateral damage rule, 
however, would not solve the problem.  If the rule were left as it is in the 
Protocol and never expected to curb military action or to be enforced (as with 
prohibitions on fornication), we would essential be condoning the 
widespread death of civilians in the wake of war.  If the rule were struck 
down (as with the prohibition on abortion), we would be left with the 
principle of distinction absent the greater protection intended by the 
collateral damage rule.  Such a solution would likely result in greater levels 
of civilian losses.  Similarly, trying to dismantle part of the overall legal 
scheme deemed to have adverse consequences, like removing the political 
offense exception to extradition treaties, would not work because the 
collateral damage rule is not causing the adverse consequences—namely the 
large numbers of civilian casualties.  Although banning the entity or action 
that causes the adverse consequences—banning armies or military attacks in 
the same way that particular weapons are banned—would, if carried out, be 
effective in reducing civilian causalities, one only has to articulate such a 
solution to know that it would be generally unacceptable.   
                                                                                                                   
 274 Id. at 206. 
 275 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 
¶ 78 (July 8).  This accords with principle of distinction: API, supra note 2, art. 48.   
 276 API, supra note 2, art. 35, ¶ 2. 
 277 See, e.g., Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other 
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 94 L.N.T.S. 65.  Other such 
conventions can be found at the ICRC Document Database located at http://icrc.org/ihl.nsf/ 
TOPICS?OpenView#CustomaryLaw.  
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VI.  CONCLUSION: A FEW MODEST SUGGESTIONS TO ASSIST THE 
FULFILLMENT OF THE COLLATERAL DAMAGE RULE 
Because of the changing nature of warfare, this Article has argued that 
modern warfare almost always results in extensive civilian death and damage 
in violation of the collateral damage rule.  The current nature of warfare, 
therefore, makes the violation of the collateral damage rule inevitable in all 
but isolated examples of war.  Armed forces are sent to war to destroy the 
enemy’s armed forces (in international armed conflict) or destroy 
government forces or rebel forces (in internal armed conflict).  They are not 
sent to kill civilians or damage civilian property except when civilian death 
or injury or civilian property damage is incidental to a legitimate attack on a 
military target.  What happens, however, in practically all cases is that the 
military activity results in at least as many civilians dying and suffering 
injury as military personnel.  Often the civilian casualties outweigh military 
casualties. 
If we simply removed the collateral damage rule while leaving, as part of 
the laws of war, the prohibition on directly targeting civilians, two possible 
results might ensue.  Any amount of civilian collateral damage would be 
permissible so long as it was somehow attached to an initial attack on a 
legitimate target.  Alternatively, no amount, or possibly only very limited 
amounts, of civilian damage would be tolerated.  Obviously, to permit 
widespread and extensive civilian damage that was somehow tangentially 
connected to a legitimate attack on military personnel or military objects 
would fly in the face of the long struggle to protect civilians from the effects 
of warfare.  Indeed, it would in large measure give the green light to carpet 
bombing whole cities and towns with weapons of mass destruction.  That 
way lies chaos.  Similarly, ruling that no amount of civilian damage will ever 
be tolerated and that all attacks resulting in any civilian losses will constitute 
violations of the laws of war seems unrealistic and draconian as long as we 
allow wars and send out armies with instructions to destroy enemy 
combatants and other military targets. 
First, we need to acknowledge that we have a problem.  Despite the 
principle of distinction and the collateral damage rule, civilians are just as 
likely, or often more likely, to die in war as military personnel.  Next, we 
need to make clear how much civilian damage is, or is not, permissible in 
attacks, campaigns, and overall wars.  Due to nearly instantaneous media 
reporting of civilian death and damage, lawmakers may be galvanized to 
require even further restrictions on civilian losses.  We know from the results 
of the recent ROEs in Afghanistan that commanders can significantly reduce 
civilian deaths.  Fashioning language to accomplish further and clearer 
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protections for civilians will not be easy, and gaining international agreement 
will take time.   
Another, concurrent step we need is a clear rule requiring states and other 
organized fighting groups to keep “body counts” of civilian dead and injured 
together with inventories of civilian damage.  These figures should be kept 
both for injuries to the state’s (or fighting group’s) own civilian personnel 
and objects and for the adversary’s civilian population and civilian 
structures.  The figures should be made public.  The ICRC, or another 
impartial body with sufficient expertise, should also be charged with 
compiling similar civilian death and damage counts and publically reporting 
the figures.   
It is widely agreed that three of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 
require states to record details of military personnel who are killed, wounded, 
captured, or go missing during armed conflict.278  The Fourth Geneva 
Convention, Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
simply requires that: “As far as military considerations allow, each Party to 
the conflict shall facilitate the steps taken to search for the [civilians] killed 
and wounded, to assist the shipwrecked and other persons exposed to grave 
danger, and to protect them against pillage and ill-treatment.”279  Additional 
Protocol I, on the other hand, actually has more detailed provisions for 
seeking and recovering the bodies of civilians lost or killed in conflict.280  
This Protocol currently has 172 parties, not including the United States.281  
Additional Protocol II has a general provision requiring parties to search for 
and collect the dead and wounded “[w]henever circumstances permit.”282  
This Protocol currently has 166 parties, again not including the United 
States.283  Obviously, the Geneva Conventions and Protocols have gaps in 
the requirements for recording all civilian deaths and injuries in armed 
conflict.   
In June 2011, Susan Breau and Rachel Joyce published a paper 
concluding that there already exists an “international legal obligation to 
record civilian casualties of armed conflict.”284  The authors reach this 
                                                                                                                   
 278 GI, supra note 11, arts. 15–17; GII, supra note 11, arts. 18–21; GIII, supra note 11, arts. 
120–121. 
 279 GIV, supra note 11, art. 16. 
 280 API, supra note 2, arts. 33–34. 
 281 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, States Party to the Following International Humanitarian 
Law and Other Related Traties (Nov. 15, 2012) [hereinafter Treaty Parties], http://www.icrc. 
org/IHL.nsf/(SPF)/party_main_treaties/$File/IHL_and_other_related_Treaties.pdf. 
 282 APII, supra note 6, art 8. 
 283 Treaty Parties, supra note 281. 
 284 Susan Breau & Rachel Joyce, Discussion Paper: The Legal Obligation to Record Civilian 
Casualties of Armed Conflict 1 (June 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http:// 
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conclusion by drawing on a broad range of international documents.285  This 
paper was published as part of a larger effort to “build the political will to 
record details of every single victim of armed conflict worldwide.”286  While 
the conclusion reached in the working paper is well argued,287 it remains true 
that states are not currently recording civilian war-related deaths in any 
systematic way.  In September of 2011, The Oxford Research Group 
launched the Charter for the Recognition of Every Casualty of Armed 
Violence, which urges states and other organizations to commit to the 
recording of every casualty of conflict throughout the world.288  This is a 
bold and courageous step.  The Charter may, one day, give rise to a binding 
treaty bringing us closer to realizing the fulfillment of the principle of 
distinction and the collateral damage rule; rules that, at the moment, are more 
often breached than observed. 
  
                                                                                                                   
www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/1st%20legal%20report%20formatted%20FI
NAL.pdf. 
 285 Id. at 3. 
 286 Oxford Research Grp., Every Casualty, available at http://www.oxfordresearchgroup. 
org.uk/rcac (last visited Mar. 12, 2013). 
 287 See generally Breau & Joyce, supra note 284. 
 288  For the language of the Oxford Research Group Charter, see the following link: http:// 
www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/other_media/charter. 
